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In recent years, scientists and researchers have devoted considerable
resources to developing medical artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Many of
these technologies—particularly those which resemble traditional medical
devices in their functions—have received substantial attention in the legal and
policy literature. But other types of novel AI technologies, such as those that relate
to quality improvement and optimizing use of scarce facilities, have been largely
absent from the discussion thus far. These AI innovations have the potential to
shed light on important aspects of health innovation policy. First, these AI
innovations interact less with the legal regimes that scholars traditionally
conceive of as shaping medical innovation: patent law, FDA regulation, and
health insurance reimbursement. Second, and perhaps related, a different set of
innovation stakeholders, including health systems and insurers, are conducting
their own research and development in these areas without waiting for
commercial product developers to innovate for them. Third and finally, the
activities of these innovators have implications for health innovation policy and
scholarship. Perhaps most notably, data possession and control play a larger role
in determining capacity to innovate in this space, while ability to satisfy the
quality standards of regulators and payers plays a smaller role, relative to more
familiar biomedical innovations such as new drugs and devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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Innovation in medical AI is exploding. Every week sees new research papers
presenting new algorithms, new companies launching new products, and new
possibilities for change. AI products promise to recognize and diagnose skin
cancer, to identify eye disease, to find kidney stones, to locate brain
hemorrhages, and to quickly detect COVID-19, among many other possibilities.1
These technologies are likely to change the practice of medicine by increasing
the capabilities of care providers in many areas. Products like these also fit—if

Am. Coll. of Radiology Data Sci. Inst., FDA Cleared AI Algorithms (2020),
https://www.acrdsi.org/DSI-Services/FDA-Cleared-AI-Algorithms; Andrew A.S.
Soltan et al., Rapid Triage for COVID-19 Using Routine Clinical Data for
Patients Attending Hospital: Development and Prospective Validation of an
Artificial Intelligence Screening Test, 3 LANCET DIG. HEALTH E78 (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30274-0.
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somewhat uncomfortably2—into a capacious understanding of what medical
devices and medical technology look like and how we expect them to be
regulated. But these are not the only AI products with the potential to transform
medicine.
Other AI innovations look quite unlike typical medical devices, but also have
the potential to transform health care in different ways.3 A seemingly mundane
example is AI-powered scheduling software, which predicts the ebb and flow of
patients within the health-care system and allocates staff to most effectively
meet those patients’ needs. Such products do not directly diagnose or treat
patients, but they could increase the capacity of a stretched system and thereby
save lives. Other products improve quality of care by predicting the likelihood
that a patient will be readmitted to the hospital within a month (so that healthcare providers can work with patients to prevent that undesirable outcome) or
by identifying the risk of a patient developing sepsis (so that rapid-response
teams can intervene early). These functions are essential to the health-care
system, and all are amenable to AI assistance.
For these forms of AI innovation, however, the traditional policy levers that
shape much biomedical innovation—patents, FDA regulation, and insurance
reimbursement4—play more uncertain and attenuated roles. Although many
innovators are actively pursuing patents, the patentability of medical AI under
U.S. law is unclear, making it risky to enforce AI patents that may be held
invalid. Patents may also be less important to would-be innovators because AI
innovations are often easy to protect via trade secrecy. Some of these
technologies may get less scrutiny from FDA, either because they do not fit
within the statutory definition of medical devices or because they fall within
categories for which FDA has traditionally exercised discretion not to enforce its
authorities. And insurance reimbursement, which normally helps both to drive
the development of medical technology and to provide some quality-related
oversight, plays little role here, as these products are typically not directly
reimbursable. The usual incentives of insurance reimbursements or patent law
exclusivity are thus lower for these forms of innovation, but barriers to entry
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 421 (2017).
3 See W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System:
Four Roles for Potential Transformation, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. SPECIAL ISSUE
122 (2019).
4 To be clear, other laws do shape innovation in this space, including privacy
laws, human subjects research protections, and trade secrecy, though they are
not our focus here. See, e.g., SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS
AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY (2017) (providing an overview of
medical big data law); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the
Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37 (2019) (describing medical privacy
laws); Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Reshma Jagsi, Big Data, Ethics, and
Regulations: Implications for Consent in the Learning Health System, 45 MED.
PHYSICS e845 (2018) (describing human subjects protection law); Arti K. Rai,
Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical
Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641 (2016) (describing regulation and
secrecy).
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from FDA or insurer oversight are lower as well. We do not argue that these
regimes are absent—some innovators in this space do seek patents and FDA
approval or clearance. Nonetheless medical AI innovation faces a substantially
different legal landscape than more traditional biomedical innovation such as
the development of new physical devices or drugs.5
Within this landscape, innovation by end users of medical AI is flourishing.
Health systems (including individual academic medical centers and hospitals)
and insurers are not only developing and using AI technologies themselves, but
they are also setting up in-house venture capital funds to invest in startups.
Health systems and insurers have different incentives than typical biomedical
innovators (such as drug and device manufacturers). Their primary purpose for
innovating is not to sell innovative products to customers. Instead, they are
developing innovative AI tools to enhance their main business of providing,
insuring, or facilitating health care. In the theoretical model elucidated by Eric
von Hippel, they are user innovators, rather than manufacturers.6 They benefit
directly from using their innovations rather without having to sell or license
them to others (though they may do both). User innovators are more likely to
focus on their own specific needs and circumstances, creating more customized
products rather than broadly available products.7
To be clear, users are not the only innovators of medical AI. Large technology
companies are developing AI-powered health software, as are small startups.
And the IT infrastructure providers of health care, the makers of electronic
health record (EHR) software, are themselves developing AI algorithms and
incorporating them into EHR products. But the innovation incentives for
commercial product developers are somewhat more traditional, and not our
focus here.
We recognize that “difference” demands a baseline. We focus on the
biomedical innovation baseline because the actors we consider here operate
largely in the world of drugs, devices, and other biomedical innovations. But we
recognize that this is not the only potential baseline. Interesting insights could
come from focusing on the different baseline of software innovation generally,
and considering how medical AI differs from other software, where patents are
of disputed value and FDA regulation and insurance reimbursement are nonplayers. See generally, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing the
scope of protection that should be afforded to software patents); John R. Allison
& Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 297 (2007) (considering the quality of software patents); Colleen V. Chien,
Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (placing reform
proposals for software into historical context). Such an analysis could examine
the impact on software development of heightened regulatory scrutiny relative
to an all-software baseline, rather than the diminished scrutiny relative to
medical devices generally that we discuss here. Although that is not this paper,
our analysis does explore the ways in which software-like features of medical AI
pose challenges for both FDA regulation and patent protection of these medical
innovations. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
6 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1, 5 (2005).
7 Id. 63–76.
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The rise of user innovation in biomedical AI has several implications for
policymakers. First, it is worth considering that the different legal landscape in
this setting may be making room for different kinds of innovators to develop
different forms of innovation. Just as the ordinarily robust legal regimes that
provide patents, FDA regulation, and insurance reimbursement shape typical
biomedical innovation in drugs and devices,8 the smaller roles these regimes
play may shape the different forms of innovation that we observe in this space.
Second, the availability and control of data confers a significant comparative
advantage on some innovators in this field. AI is easier to develop in-house for
health systems or insurers with their own large stocks of patient health
information. Smaller institutions, or commercial firms without access to such
data, may be incapable of competing. Third, a proliferation of biomedical user
innovators brings challenges as well as opportunities. User innovators tend to
design technologies tailored to their own needs and circumstances,9 which may
differ from the circumstances of other potential users. Even larger institutional
datasets are limited in scope, limiting the power and generalizability of AI
solutions based on those datasets. Problems of error, overfitting, or data biases
might go unrecognized without effective oversight from FDA or insurers. These
effects have broader impacts on quality, cost, and equity of medical AI more
generally.
The rest of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II canvasses the
landscape of nontraditional innovation in medical AI and describes the novel
innovators involved, focusing on the roles and incentives of health systems and
health insurers. Part III looks to the primary regimes that scholars have
generally recognized as shaping biomedical innovation—patent law, FDA
oversight, and insurance reimbursement—and explains how their role is
diminished or uncertain for these technologies. Part IV addresses the
implications of these analyses, including concerns around the availability of
data, the customization of local solutions to local problems, and risks of difficultto-detect quality concerns. A few brief thoughts conclude.

II. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW INNOVATORS

rin

AI powers a proliferating set of new medical technologies. Some AI tools are
directly involved in patient care, such as systems that diagnose medical issues
or monitor patients for signs of medical problems that can be aided by early
intervention. Some function more in the background, such as algorithms to
predict the likelihood of future adverse outcomes. Still others are even further
removed from the point of patient care, monitoring and shaping the flow of
patients or care providers across a hospital to increase system efficiency or to

See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
13 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007); Amy Kapczynski &
Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE
L. J. 1900 (2013); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug
Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 193, 201–08
(2016) (hereinafter Sachs, Prizing Insurance).
9 VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33-44.
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increase the volume of care provided. Each of these avenues has the potential to
impact the health-care landscape and the experience of patient care.
The new technologies we consider here fall largely outside the scope of
existing policy and legal scholarship on medical AI. That small but growing body
of scholarship has considered legal aspects of commercially developed AI-driven
products that directly drive or inform patient care and that pass through FDA’s
traditional review process.10 An example is IDx-DR, a software program that
autonomously diagnoses more-than-mild diabetic retinopathy based on images
of the base of the retina. IDx-DR was cleared in 2018 by FDA as a Class II
medical device and has since been sold commercially and implemented at sites
around the country.11 FDA has cleared dozens of medical devices12 that rely on
AI to perform a function like classification, diagnosis, or risk prediction. These
products, while important, are not our focus here. Instead, we consider the vast
breadth of AI-powered medical technology that arises outside the typical
development path.
In many ways the new innovators we consider in this project—health
systems and insurers—can be thought of as user innovators. They innovate to
address their own immediate problems or to adapt available technologies to
work for their purposes, when commercially available products are inadequate
to address those needs.13 This distinguishes these innovators from companies

See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Frank Pasquale, Product Liability Suits for
FDA-Regulated AI/ML Software, in Innovation and Protection: The Future of
FDA Medical Device Regulation (I. Glenn Cohen, Nicholson Price, Timo Minssen
& Carmel Shachar eds. 2021 forthcoming); Price, supra note 2; Charlotte
Tschider, Preempting the Artificially Intelligent Machine, B.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443987.
11 See Food & Drug Admin., Letter to Janice Hogan (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180001.pdf
(classifying
IDx-DR as a Class II medical device); Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits
Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain DiabetesRelated Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-devicedetect-certain-diabetes-related-eye; Aimee Breaux, With New CEO, Artificial
Intelligence Start-Up Expects 2020 to Be “Year of Mass Adoption,” IOWA CITY
PRESS
CITIZEN
(Dec.
11,
2019),
https://www.presscitizen.com/story/news/2019/12/11/coralville-ai-start-up-expects-2020-yearmass-adoption/4398173002/ (“Abramoff said IDx has sold these devices to
around two dozen hospital systems. . . In November, the company announced a
new type of client, retail clinics. The company closed a deal with grocery store
chain Albertsons to outfit five of the company's retail clinics with IDx cameras.”).
12 As of September 2020, 64 machine learning or AI-based algorithms and
devices had been approved by the FDA. See Stan Benjamens et al., The State of
Artificial Intelligence-Based FDA-Approved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An
Online Database, 3 NPJ DIGITAL MEDICINE 1, 1 (2020). To be sure, there is
substantial contestable space about what in this field counts as a “medical
device;” we consider those questions to some extent in Part III.A.
13 Importantly, we do not mean to suggest that commercial products are not
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specializing in the development and sale of cutting-edge health care technologies
in the pharmaceutical or medical device area. Those companies identify
potential new therapeutic products and shepherd them through costly
premarket testing, navigating complex federal bureaucracies to secure
intellectual property rights, FDA clearance or approval to gain market access,
and insurance reimbursement procedures to ensure commercial success. The
cost, risk, and time needed to bring to market a new pharmaceutical14 or medical
device15 limit the companies that are able to succeed in this complex
environment. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies specialize in
dealing with these regulatory structures and are shaped by these legal and
financial dynamics.
The medical AI innovation context we examine here is quite different. FDA
regulation, patents, and insurance payments still matter, but the costs of
navigating the legal landscape are less daunting, and the rewards more
uncertain (as we will discuss infra, in Part III). Innovation depends less on
ability to conduct clinical trials that will satisfy FDA than on access to large
volumes of data collected in the course of clinical care. In this environment,
health systems and insurers have emerged as key actors in medical AI
innovation.
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available to serve these goals. For instance, Epic, the largest EHR vendor in the
United States, Meg Bryant, Epic, Cerner Control 85% of Large Hospital EHR
Space,
KLAS
Reports,
HEALTHCARE
DIVE,
(May
2,
2019),
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/epic-cerner-control-85-of-large-hospitalehr-space-klas-reports/553906/, has developed and implemented a sepsis
predictor, in addition to the health system-developed ones we describe in this
Part. Bill Silwicki, Health System Uses Epic EHR Communications Tech to
Reduce Sepsis Mortality Rate by 20%, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (October 1, 2019),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/health-system-uses-epic-ehrcommunications-tech-reduce-sepsis-mortality-rate-20. But even with the
existence of tools like these, many health systems have chosen to develop their
own products.
14 Although the precise cost to develop a new drug is hotly debated, there is
no question that pharmaceuticals are among the most costly new products to
bring to market, with estimates typically placing the cost to develop a new drug
at well over a billion dollars. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20,
20 (2016) (estimating pre-approval costs to be $2.558 billion); OFF. HEALTH
ECON.,
THE
R&D
COST
OF
A
NEW
MEDICINE
(2013),
http://www.slideshare.net/OHENews/rd-cost-of-anew-medicine-mestreferrandiz-19-jan2013 (estimating costs at $1.5 billion); Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged
Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426,
448–57 (2014).
15 Josh Makower et al., FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Innovation 28 (Nov.
2010),
http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/FDA%20impact%20on%20U.S.%
20Medical%20Technology%20Innovation.pdf (estimating the cost of developing
a Class III medical device at $94 million).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
7
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

8

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

A. Health Systems

we
d

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 182 [2021]

pe

er

re

vie

Health systems16 are longtime stakeholders in health care, playing an
integral role in the delivery of health care services as well as in health care
research. However, they have typically not been a focus of legal academic
scholarship around the development of new health care technology products.17
To be sure, the medical literature recognizes that hospitals—particularly
academic medical centers—serve as research sites in the clinical trials process,
providing patients for enrollment in trials seeking to test the safety and efficacy
of a candidate drug or device.18 But in these contexts the outside product
manufacturer may be the party in control of the research, rather than the
hospital or broader health system itself.
These dynamics are different in the context of AI technologies, where health
systems have played a larger role in driving the development of a wide range of
innovative AI products. Their incentives to innovate, however, are different from
the incentives of the product developing firms that are the focus of much of the
scholarly literature. In the AI context, health systems are less concerned with
the ability to obtain patents, the prospect of securing insurance reimbursement
for their new products, or the need to traverse the FDA clearance or approval
process.
Instead, health systems are motivated by different types of goals. Very
commonly, they seek to reduce costs, increase clinical volume and revenue,
improve quality, and satisfy genuine scientific curiosity. Importantly, though,
health systems may be unable to serve these goals with one-size-fits-all AI
products. Products that will achieve these goals are likely to vary substantially
across health systems, not only because different health systems may weight
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By health system, we mean a set of health care organizations that are
contractually affiliated with each other, particularly including the relationship
between hospitals and outpatient physician organizations. See, e.g., Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Defining Health Systems (Sept. 2017),
https://www.ahrq.gov/chsp/chsp-reports/resources-for-understanding-healthsystems/defining-health-systems.html. While we recognize that individual
hospitals may have slightly different incentives and capacities than health
systems, for the sake of convenience we generally include individual hospitals
within the broad term “health system.”
17 Of course, considerable research occurs in hospitals, particularly in
academic medical centers, including developing new medical procedures or
protocols. But legal scholarship in intellectual property and innovation policy
has largely focused on the commercial development of new health care
technology products, perhaps in part because the Patent Act explicitly bars the
enforcement of patents granted on medical procedures. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c);
Jonas Anderson, Nonexcludable Surgical Method Patents, 61 WILLIAM & MARY
L. REV. 637, 657 (2020).
18 See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance – Clinical Investigators
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000);
Hamilton Moses, III et al., Collaborating with Industry – Choices for the
Academic Medical Center, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1371–72 (2002).
16
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these goals differently, but also because they have different patient populations
and different structural constraints and will need to customize and train their
AI products to accommodate those differences. Hospitals of different sizes, with
different specialties, or with different seasonal patient volumes will need to
develop different ways of managing capacity strain and provider staffing, for
example.
These features make it useful to understand the development of AI models
by health systems (sometimes in collaboration with external firms) as examples
of user innovation.19 AI allows health systems to address needs that differ
sufficiently across institutions that off-the-shelf models are unlikely to be
immediately useful to them. Moreover, health systems also possess sufficient
resources to develop their own models (or at least to contribute substantially to
the development of such models).20 Medical AI tools trained on their own data
offer health systems opportunities to make improvements in their own
operations at reasonable cost. Use of their own data both limits the costs of
innovation and ensures that the results are targeted to their own needs and
circumstances.
First and most prominently, health systems may feel pressure to compete on
quality, especially in light of HHS’ imposition of financial penalties for particular
types of complications—and financial bonuses for others.21 High quality medical
care can be difficult to deliver consistently because of differences among patients
that are difficult to observe. Ideally, patients would be continuously monitored
along many dimensions, using all available information to choose the exactly
right intervention for each patient at exactly the right time. This would allow
caregivers to treat patients quickly and effectively while also avoiding
unnecessary treatment. But it is a challenging goal; constant monitoring is labor
intensive and accurate analysis requires skill and knowledge. AI can help by
monitoring patients and predicting or quickly identifying adverse events in time
for intervention.22 Because AI systems base their predictions on huge amounts
of data, the underlying rationale may be opaque to human observers. Many
health systems have begun to develop AI tools that will assist physicians in
lowering their institutions’ rates of different types of adverse events.
At the University of Michigan, researchers developed a predictor for the risk
of infection with Clostridium difficile (C. diff.), a bacterium that infects

Other scholars have applied the user innovation paradigm to a wide range
of innovation settings, including biomedical research tools, Katherine J.
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO.
L. REV. 467, 472 (2008); products for people with disabilities, Christopher
Buccafusco, Disability and Design, 95 NYU L. REV. 952, 1007 (2020; and other
consumer goods. See generally, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Implications for
Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2012).
20 See VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33.
21 See infra text accompanying note 162.
22 For an analysis of the translational process and a list of products in
development, including many originating in academia, see Mark P. Sendak et
al., A Path for Translation of Machine Learning Products into Healthcare
Delivery, EMJ INNOVATIONS 19-00172 (2020), DOI/10.33590/emjinnov/19-00172.
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hundreds of thousands of patients per year in health-care settings.23 C. diff. can
be deadly or debilitating, and has become increasingly resistant to antibiotic
treatment.24 The Michigan team used electronic health record (EHR) data from
many thousands of patients to develop the predictive tool, which now makes
daily predictions at Michigan Medicine to identify patients at high risk of
infection for closer monitoring. The predictor is based on hundreds of EHRderived variables, some of which accord with prior clinical understanding (e.g.,
high respiratory rate) but most of which do not.25 The predictor can also be used
to drive systematic improvements, such as isolating particularly vulnerable
patients from the rest of the health system’s population to protect them from
infection.
Other health systems have developed their own C. diff. prediction tools
trained on their own data.26 Some have tried to create one-size-fits-all models
that work for all institutions, but have encountered difficulties based on
differences between health systems.27 The Michigan team collaborated with
researchers from Mass General Hospital on an intermediate approach: a
generalizable method that can be used to develop models that fit the particular
health systems that will use them.28
Duke University has developed and implemented its Sepsis Watch system
to monitor patients for sepsis. Sepsis is a serious and often fatal condition in
which the body’s inflammatory response to an infection goes into overdrive. It
can quickly become fatal and kills about 270,000 patients annually in the United
States. Duke’s AI system, trained on EHR data, makes real-time predictions
about patients’ risk of sepsis and alerts a rapid response team to intervene early
and catch sepsis in its early stages. Notably, the system is relatively opaque
because “[c]linical leaders . . . were willing to trade-off model interpretability for
performance gains.”29 Researchers did not prioritize model interpretability,
because sepsis may have many causes and treatment does not depend on which
of those causes is present. Duke developed the system in its main hospital and
has since rolled it out—with substantial effort and adaptation—at its two other,

Jeeheh Oh et al., A Generalizable, Data-Driven Approach to Predict Daily
Risk of Clostridium Difficile Infection at Two Large Academic Health Centers, 39
INFECTION CONT. & HOSP. EPIDEMIOL. 425 (2018).
24 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
THREATS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
2019,
at
vii
(2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/biggest-threats.html.
25 Benjamin Y. Li et al., Using Machine Learning and the Electronic Health
Record to Predict Complicated Clostridium Difficile Infection, 6 OPEN F.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE ofz186 (2019).
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Xi Na et al., A Multi-Center Prospective Derivation and
Validation of a Clinical Prediction Tool for Severe Clostridium Difficile
Infection,10 PLOS ONE e0123405 (2015).
28 Oh et al., supra note 23.
29 Mark Sendak et al., Real-World Integration of a Sepsis Deep Learning
Technology Into Routine Clinical Care: Implementation Study, 8 JMIR MED
INFORM 1, 6 (2020).
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smaller hospitals.30 During adoption, it was explicitly promoted to providers “as
a home-grown solution to an important problem within the hospital,”31—though
Duke has since licensed Cohere Med to develop the unpatented system for wider
use in other settings.32
Health systems are also acutely interested in patient readmission—that is,
the likelihood that a discharged patient will be readmitted to a hospital within
a given time frame (typically 30 days). Thirty-day readmission rate is a marker
of care quality, and something health systems try to minimize. Readmission
within a short time frame is a sign that something has gone wrong with the
patient’s care: perhaps the patient’s issues were not properly resolved, or the
patient should not have been discharged yet. Multiple health systems have
developed their own AI-powered tools to identify patients at high risk of
readmission to target them for intervention (for instance, assigning a nurse to
coordinate their outpatient care). Researchers at the University of Texas
Southwestern hospital in Dallas developed a 30-day readmission model which
they externally validated in seven large hospitals.33 UT Southwestern has since
spun out the model to the private firm Pieces, which now offers it as a part of its
“Pieces Predict” commercial product.34
As yet another example, Intermountain Healthcare has partnered with an
external firm to develop better ways of managing their patients with chronic
kidney disease, with the goal of reducing hospitalizations and improving

Mark Sendak et al., “The Human Body is a Black Box”: Supporting
Clinical Decision-Making With Deep Learning, FAT* ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2020 CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 99
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372827 (describing the development of
Sepsis Watch as a sociotechnical system); Andrew Ng, THE BATCH (April 15,
2020), https://blog.deeplearning.ai/blog/the-batch-ai-for-medicine-special-erictopols-planetary-health-system-discovering-drugs-diagnosing-heart-diseasepredicting-infections-alexa-for-doctors (noting the deployment of Sepsis Watch
to two community hospitals).
31 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 8. In order to increase provider buy-in,
“[t]hroughout the design, development, and implementation process, Sepsis
Watch was described as a ‘tool’ to support physicians and nurses in the ED and
the term ‘artificial intelligence’ was not used in any communication or
presentation.” Id. at 10.
32 Cohere Med, “Deep Sepsis” Licensed to Cohere Med, DUKE LICENSING &
VENTURES (July 3, 2019), https://olv.duke.edu/news/deep-sepsis-licensed-tocohere-med/.
33
Ruben Amarasingham et al., Electronic Medical Record-Based
Multicondition Models to Predict the Risk of 30 Day Readmission or Death
Among Adult Medicine Patients: Validation and Comparison to Existing Models,
15 BMC MED. INFORMATICS DEC. MAKERS 39 (2015); Mark P. Sendak et al., A
Path for Translation of Machine Learning Products into Healthcare Delivery,
EMJ INNOVATIONS 19-00172 (2020), DOI/10.33590/emjinnov/19-00172.
34 Pieces Technology, Our Products, https://piecestech.com (last visited Jan.
29, 2021).
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outcomes.35 Tools like these could enable health systems to provide better care
at lower prices—while maintaining existing levels of service provision or
reimbursement requests.36
Second and relatedly, health systems generally seek to increase clinical
volume and revenue where possible. Health systems therefore have incentives
to develop AI tools that can, for example, assist physicians in completing
procedures more quickly, or identify additional patients who would benefit from
further services. One such example comes from Cedars-Sinai in Los Angeles,37
which has developed an AI tool to reduce capacity strain on the system. Capacity
strain may lead to crowded ERs, cause delays or cancellations of surgeries, result
in unnecessary readmissions, and create provider burnout. By predicting more
accurately the hospital’s patient census, their AI tool aims to decrease treatment
delays, improve staff schedules (including reducing the need to pay overtime),
and increase admissions, while avoiding overcrowding.
Other examples focus on resource allocation and efficiency, decreasing the
resources needed for care and, perhaps simultaneously, increasing the volume
of care provided with existing resources. Duke is using AI to optimize bed flow—
that is, the movement of patients between different hospital units during
different time periods after admission.38 After the COVID-19-related shutdown
of elective surgery, Duke also turned to AI to prioritize the most important
elective surgeries.39
Third, all things being equal, health systems aim to reduce different types
of costs. In particular, health systems seek to reduce back-end costs related to
coding, billing, and transacting with third parties (such as insurers or
regulators), as these costs do not themselves either serve a direct patient care
mission or garner reimbursement for the hospital. They represent
administrative frictions that cannot be eliminated entirely, but are often far
higher in the highly-fragmented U.S. health-care system (where providers must
develop the infrastructure to contract with and bill a variety of different

Jessica Kent, Applying Artificial Intelligence to Chronic Disease
IT
ANALYTICS
(Sept.
18,
2020),
Management,
HEALTH
https://healthitanalytics.com/features/applying-artificial-intelligence-tochronic-disease-management.
36 Hospitals have less incentive to reduce their costs of care if doing so will
lower their overall reimbursement totals or profit margins. As such, these tools
are likely to be more powerful where hospitals are operating in a managed-care
or otherwise value-based context, rather than in a pure fee-for-service model.
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 10–13 (1999).
37 Michael Thompson, New Ways to Improve Hospital Flow With Predictive
Analytics
(2019),
https://downloads.healthcatalyst.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/11Applying_Predictive_Analytics_For_Improving_Hospital_Flow-ThompsonHAS2019.pdf.
38 Email conversation with Mark Sendak, Duke Institute for Health
Innovation (June 11, 2020).
39 Id.
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insurers) than in other, less-fragmented health care systems.40 Some AI
innovations assist health systems in reducing these back-end costs. One health
system uses an AI system to analyze physician visit notes for reimbursable
events that were not coded for reimbursement and flags those events for human
review.41 This system not only increases revenue for already-provided care; it
also decreases the cost of human review devoted to billing.42
Fourth, although these health systems are businesses subject to standard
corporate financial incentives,43 scientific curiosity plays a motivating role as
well. Academic medical centers in particular perform clinical research in
addition to providing patient care.44 For academic medical centers, advancing
knowledge is a part of the institutional mission—and given the substantial grant
funds available for biomedical research, including in the medical AI field,45
innovation may also have financial implications. Academic medical centers have
been at the forefront of new AI research that might be less attractive to
commercial firms focused on the traditional financial motivations of patentprotected commercialization and insurance reimbursement. Some of this
research more closely resembles traditional basic research into the drivers and
progression of certain conditions46 than it resembles the more applied
innovations being developed for the prevention of sepsis or readmissions
described above. Many of these initiatives are government-funded and use
techniques of artificial intelligence and machine learning to gain greater
understandings of particularly complex conditions, such as Alzheimer’s Disease
or brain genomics more generally.47
See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al., Health Care Administrative Costs
in the United States and Canada, 2017, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1 (2020);
Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United
States and Canada, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 768 (2003); KAREN DAVIS ET AL.,
SLOWING THE GROWTH OF U.S. HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES: WHAT ARE THE
OPTIONS?, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4 (Jan. 2007).
41 Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020).
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Hospitals Knew How to Make Money. Then
(May
15,
2020),
Coronavirus
Happened.,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/hospitals-revenue-coronavirus.html.
44 Of course, non-academic medical centers are also made up of health care
providers who may be individually motivated by genuine scientific and medical
curiosity.
45 See, e.g., National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering,
Research Funding: Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning
(last updated 2020), https://www.nibib.nih.gov/research-funding/machinelearning; Amarnath R. Annapureddy et al., The National Institutes of Health
Funding for Clinical Research Applying Machine Learning Techniques in 2017,
3 NPJ DIGITAL MED. 1 (2020).
46 See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1 (2019).
47 See, e.g., Xi Luo, Large-Scale Network Modeling for Brain Dynamics:
Statistical Learning and Optimization, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
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The smaller role of the traditional innovation policy levers discussed in Part
III may if anything make it easier for health systems to engage in this broad
range of AI innovation. Health systems seeking to develop AI technologies can
do so with far less financial investment than companies developing traditional
medical products, for several reasons: rather than paying for costly data
collection through clinical trials, they can repurpose data that they have already
created in the form of healthcare records of clinical care, and they are much less
likely to go through a costly FDA review process for their AI technologies. As a
result of these lower development costs, health systems may not need
substantial, standalone reimbursements for these innovations and can instead
recoup their investments by reducing costs, by increasing volumes, or by
improving quality metrics. In other cases, health systems are covering their
investment expenses by obtaining grants or prize awards (most notably but not
only from the federal government).48 In still other situations, as noted above,
health systems may develop these AI tools in collaboration with outside firms,
contributing their valuable patient health data for the company’s use.49 Patent
protection may be less important for these AI technologies because of the
difficulty for competitors of reproducing technologies that rely on access to
confidential data sets and use opaque algorithms.50

B. Insurers
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ot

pe

Health insurers have also been longtime stakeholders in the delivery and
coverage of health care services. Insurers themselves are a varied group with
diverging interests. Even putting aside the role of the federal government as an
insurer, providing coverage for more than 100 million Americans through
Medicare and Medicaid alone,51 private insurers play a range of different roles
in health care delivery and coverage. Insurance companies may provide
insurance for businesses that offer health benefits to their employees, or may
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REPORT
(2019),
https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_
description.cfm?aid=9899033&icde=0; Li Shen, Integrative Bioinformatics
Approaches to Human Brain Genomics and Connectomics, NATIONAL INSTITUTES
OF HEALTH REPORT (2019), https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_
description.cfm?aid=9694688.
48 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., AI Health Outcomes Challenge
(2019), https://ai.cms.gov/ (listing Geisinger, Jefferson Health, Mayo Clinic,
Northwestern, UVA as health systems receiving awards).
49 See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and
Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 J AM. MED. ASS’N 1141 (2019); Kayte SpectorBagdady et al., Sharing Health Data and Biospecimens with Industry – A
Principle-Driven, Practical Approach, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. 2072 (2020).
50 See Price, supra note 2 , at 434.
51 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 109 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/AboutCMS/Agency
-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJFinal.pdf.
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serve as third-party administrators that process insurance claims for employers
who self-insure coverage for their employees.52 Insurance companies may offer
fee-for-service plans, reimbursing providers for each service they provide, or
they may use a managed care model, requiring providers to work within more
tightly specified budgets.53 Private insurance firms even play a large role in the
deployment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, as 22 million seniors now
purchase privately-run Medicare Advantage plans54 and 54 million Medicaid
enrollees have their coverage provided by comprehensive Managed Care
Organizations, through private insurers.55
In general, however, insurers have not featured prominently in discussions
of the process of innovation into new health care technologies.56 But the role of
insurers has changed for new AI technologies. Like the hospitals and health
systems described above, insurers’ incentives to reduce care costs and increase
efficiency have driven them to invest in the development of certain types of new
AI products. In this way, insurers can also be understood as user innovators,
seeking to develop customized products for use in their own operations.57
Insurers have financial motivations to reduce care costs. If an insurer has
budgeted a particular amount of money for the care of each beneficiary each
year, the cost of care that exceeds that projected budget will often be borne by
the insurer, not by an employer or by the patient. Insurers thus have incentives
to discourage patients from seeking unnecessary care, where possible. For
example, an insurer might prefer that a patient see a primary care doctor or visit
an urgent care clinic for non-emergency care, rather than going to a (more

Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95
WASH. U.L. REV. 127, 188 (2017).
53 Korobkin, supra note 36, at 10, 12–13.
54 Gretchen Jacobson et al., A Dozen Facts About Medicare Advantage in
FAMILY
FOUNDATION
(June
6,
2019),
2019,
KAISER
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/a-dozen-facts-about-medicareadvantage-in-2019/.
55 Elizabeth Hinton et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed Care,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/10-things-to-know-about-medicaid-managed-care/.
56 Although as discussed infra in Part III.C, a growing body of scholarship
has started to address the role that insurers and reimbursement may play in the
health innovation space. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 8 (describing insurance
reimbursement incentives for insurers); Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 NYU L. REV.
75 (2020) (describing how Medicare reimbursement creates subsidies for
particular types of biomedical innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting
Institutional Roles in Biomedical Innovation in a Learning Healthcare System,
14 J. INST. ECON. 1139 (2018) (describing the new role of insurers in innovation);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation
on the Demand Side, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017) (describing innovation by
insurers themselves).
57 Eisenberg, supra, at 1141.
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expensive) emergency room.58 Many insurers have developed non-AI initiatives
designed to help patients figure out what type of care might be right for them,
such as providing 24-hour triage nurse lines.59
Insurers are also working on AI-based products that help both doctors and
patients make triage decisions. Highmark, affiliated with Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, aims to use AI tools both to prevent the onset of chronic conditions and
to treat them more effectively.60 Highmark’s recent development partnership
with Google Cloud will allow Highmark to contribute its patient data to the
collaboration, with the goal of benefiting from Google Cloud’s AI expertise.61
Importantly, at least some of these AI tools—such as one developed by Optum,
a division of UnitedHealth, which also aims to better manage patients with
chronic conditions—have resulted in disturbing racially disparate impacts on
patients,62 a topic to which we return in Part V.
Closely related to reducing the costs of care, insurers are motivated to
increase efficiency in the reimbursement process. Just as hospitals and health
systems must develop the infrastructure to contract with and bill many different
insurers for the care they provide to their patients, insurers must develop the
infrastructure to work with many different health care providers and to manage
the claim review process. Insurers are working to develop AI-based technologies

At least one large insurance company, Anthem, has developed a policy of
denying coverage for emergency room visits that it later deems to have been
“unnecessary.” This policy has come under strong criticism, as patients
themselves do not always know whether a hospital visit is “necessary” when
symptoms are concerning. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, An ER Visit, a $12,000 Bill –
And a Health Insurer That Wouldn’t Pay, VOX (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/29/16906558/anthememergency-room-coverage-denials-inappropriate;
Samantha
Raphelson,
Anthem Policy Discouraging “Avoidable” Emergency Room Visits Faces
Criticism,
NPR
(May
23,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/05/23/613649094/anthem-policy-discouragingavoidable-emergency-room-visits-faces-criticism.
59 See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Health Insurers Hire Thousands of Nurses to
(Sept.
25,
2015),
Coordinate
Care,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/09/25/health-insurers-hirethousands-of-nurses-amid-shift-to-value-based-care/#51531d96d9d7.
60 Jim Molis, AI Tools Improves Care to Patients With Chronic Conditions –
and Savings for Insurers and Employers, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (May 1,
2020),
https://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2020/05/01/ai-toolsimproves-care-to-patients-with-chronic.html.
61 Highmark Health, Highmark Health Partners with Google Cloud to Raise
Standard for Customer and Clinician Engagement in Health (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.highmarkhealth.org/hmk/newsroom/pr/2020/2020-12-17-LivingHealth.shtml.
62 Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to
Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Quinn
Gawronski, Racial Bias Found in Widely Used Health Care Algorithm, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/racial-bias-foundwidely-used-health-care-algorithm-n1076436.
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In addition to developing AI tools either in-house or in partnerships with
external firms, both health systems and insurers are also developing additional
ways in which they can fund outside innovators.64 At least some of these VCfunded efforts are designed to produce novel AI-based technologies. Many of
them also fall into the above categories—for instance, Cigna Ventures has
invested in a company using AI to target precision medicine efforts, aiming to
target treatments to particular patients.65 UnitedHealth’s Optum Ventures has
devoted a portion of its $600 million venture fund to Mindstrong Health,66 which
seeks to deliver mental health care virtually in a way that functions to “lower[]
the inpatient readmission rate” and “ER admission rate.”67
Health systems also fund innovations that come directly from their own
internal work, but which may need further external development. Several of
these funds are sponsored by large, well-known health systems—such as the
Mayo Clinic68 or Cleveland Clinic69—but many smaller health systems have
funds as well. Providence Ventures, the venture capital fund of Seattle-based
Tom Davenport & Randy Bean, Optum Focuses on AI to Improve
(Oct.
9,
2020),
Administrative
Decisions,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomdavenport/2020/10/09/optum-focuses-on-ai-toimprove-administrative-decisions/?sh=4c0408086dad.
64 The named insurers are not the only ones to have developed venture funds.
For instance, BlueCross BlueShield has also developed a Venture Fund. See Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association, Blue Venture Fund (last visited June 5,
2020), https://blueventurefund.com/. BCBS has also engaged in novel innovation
challenges, such as its Data Innovation Challenge which rewarded the winning
firms (of over 130 applicants) not with money, but with access to patient data.
BlueCross BlueShield Association, Thrive Earlier Detection Wins the BlueCross
BlueShield Data Innovation Challenge (2019), https://www.bcbs.com/bluecrossblueshield-data-innovation-challenge.
65 Tracey Walker, Cigna Leverages AI, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE
(July 15, 2019), https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/article/cignaleverages-ai.
66 Christopher Snowbeck, Optum Ventures Backs Startup That Uses AI To
(Sept.
26,
2018),
Aid
in
Medical
Diagnosis,
STAR TRIBUNE
https://www.startribune.com/optum-ventures-backs-startup-that-uses-ai-toaid-in-medical-diagnosis/494377661/?refresh=true.
67
Mindstrong Health, About Us (last visited Jan. 28, 2021),
https://mindstrong.com/about-us/.
68
Mayo
Clinic
Ventures,
Business
Development
(2021),
http://ventures.mayoclinic.org/business-development.php.
69 The Rise of Hospital-Backed Venture Capital Funds, BECKER’S HOSPITAL
REVIEW (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcareinformation-technology/the-rise-of-hospital-backed-venture-capital-funds.html.
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Providence Health & Services, plans to invest $150 million in new IT products
“designed to improve care coordination, patient engagement, data analytics” and
other priorities.70
Because these innovators are working to meet their own needs rather than
to sell to a commercial market, they respond differently to the set of legal levers
that policymakers often use to encourage innovation—a subject to which we now
turn. These innovators are relatively undeterred by the uncertainty of patent
protection for their innovations, and because they are not selling a product they
have no need to reassure purchasers that the high price of their innovations will
be covered by insurance. At the same time, in some cases these AI innovators
may not need to complete the lengthy, risky FDA review process before putting
their products to use, making the costs of developing these AI products far lower
than the costs of developing conventional therapeutic products for commercial
sale. These altered dynamics help explain both why different innovation
stakeholders have emerged as the prime movers in medical AI innovation and
also how those stakeholders’ incentives are shaped.

er

III. DIMINISHED LEGAL REGIMES: QUALITY OVERSIGHT AND
INCENTIVES
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Three major legal regimes that shape biomedical innovation are less robust
in the context of these new AI technologies than they are for other biomedical
innovation. Most of these AI tools are subject to substantially less rigorous FDA
scrutiny than are traditional new prescription drugs or medical devices, either
as a matter of statutory constraint or as a matter of FDA’s enforcement
discretion. Patent incentives are less reliable for several reasons, including
limitations on patent eligible subject matter under U.S. law and difficulties
complying with patent law disclosure requirements for algorithms that are
opaque and constantly changing. Patents may also be less important because of
the effectiveness of trade secrecy for these innovations. And because most of the
AI technologies involved are not reimbursable by insurers, insurance coverage
determinations fail to supply either direct incentives or an independent source
of quality oversight. The relative weakness of these regimes on one hand reduces
legal incentives for development of these AI technologies, but on the other hand
reduces barriers to entry. At the same time, the weakness of these regimes limits
the levers available to policymakers seeking to shape the development of this
burgeoning set of AI tools. Other mechanisms are available—grants or prizes
could drive development, and tort law or state medical boards could provide
oversight—but the traditional policy levers are harder to pull.

A. FDA regulation

Pr

FDA performs a critical technology oversight role under the Food, Drug &
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Cosmetic Act (FDCA)71 before many new biomedical technologies may be
introduced in commerce. Although regulation adds to the costs of developing
these products, it also promotes innovation in at least two ways. First, by
demanding that data from clinical trials of new products be collected and
submitted to FDA as a condition for premarket approval or clearance, regulation
motivates innovating firms to invest in a costly and socially valuable form of
R&D. Second, by imposing regulatory entry barriers on other firms before they
can market competing versions of successful new technologies, regulation gives
innovators a head start before they face price-lowering competition.72
The landscape appears to be quite different for many technologies described
in this Article. Health systems and insurers are routinely developing and
implementing AI systems that shift the way care is provided, whether directly
or indirectly, without seeking FDA clearance or approval—indeed, as of this
writing, no FDA cleared or approved AI devices were sponsored by health
systems, hospitals, academic medical centers, or insurers.73 And yet such user
innovators regularly deploy their own AI-based systems, as described above.
What explains this difference?
Leaving aside the possibility that some innovators may be flouting FDA’s
requirements, there are several good reasons that the agency keeps a lower
profile here. Some of the technologies considered in this paper are likely beyond
the reach of FDA’s regulatory authority. Others may be within FDA’s authority,
but it may decline to regulate them as a matter of enforcement discretion
because of its current perception that they do not present much risk to patients.
To be clear, FDA is actively reevaluating its regulatory approach to AI and
machine learning functions that are intended for use in the care, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, leaving some uncertainty as to what future
regulation will look like. We do not mean to suggest that the agency is absent—
even where it leaves unregulated spaces, the limits of those spaces shape the
actions of health systems and insurers in developing the technologies noted
above. Nevertheless, the overall picture is one of lower regulatory hurdles for
medical AI, particularly when it is developed and deployed by user innovators.

1. The limits of FDA’s regulatory authority
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FDA has never had comprehensive authority to regulate all new medical
technologies, and much biomedical innovation has routinely happened in the
course of activities that are beyond FDA’s reach. By long tradition, FDA does not
regulate the practice of medicine, including innovative new uses by physicians
of products that were previously approved or cleared as safe and effective for

Pub. L. No. 75-717 (1938) (codified as amended in provisions set forth in
Title 21 of the U.S. Code).
72 See Eisenberg, supra note 8.
73
The Medical Futurist, FDA-Approved A.I.-Based Algorithms,
https://medicalfuturist.com/fda-approved-ai-based-algorithms/ (last visited
January 23, 2021).
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other purposes.74 Health-care providers have always played an important role
in biomedical innovation as they learn by doing,75 giving critical feedback and
suggestions for improvements to firms that develop regulated products as well
as continuously improving unregulated technologies such as surgical
techniques.76
Another important limitation is that the FDCA only applies to products that
are introduced, delivered, or received in interstate commerce.77 Many of the
technologies that we consider in this paper are developed and used within
institutions like health systems that do not sell them to others or otherwise
make them available in commerce. As a result, information technology products
developed within a health-care institution without the use of components
derived from commerce, and used only internally to analyze the institution’s own
data, might be beyond the constitutional and statutory limits of FDA
regulation—lawyers have certainly made this argument regarding the FDA’s
authority to regulate laboratory-developed diagnostic tests, which are also
developed and deployed within a particular health-care institution.78 However,
courts have also upheld the FDA’s exercise of its jurisdiction in similar
circumstances.79
FDA’s authority is also limited because not all of the AI technologies
See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit
or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship relationship.”);
Wendy Teo, FDA and the Practice of Medicine: Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41
SETON HALL LEG. J. 305 (2017). But see Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent
Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427 (2015) (arguing the
distinction between medical products and the practice of medicine is indistinct).
75 Richard R. Nelson et al., How Medical Know-How Progresses, 40
RESEARCH POLICY 1339 (2011).
76 See Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, The Dynamics of Technological
Change in Medicine, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28 (1994).
77 21 U.S.C. § 331; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(b) (“The term “interstate
commerce means (1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place
outside thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any
other Territory not organized with a legislative body.”) Although health and
safety regulation is traditionally relegated to the states, the limitation of
prohibited activities to interstate commerce gave Congress authority to enact
the legislation under Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution (“The Congress shall
have Power … To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States ….”).
78 PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES,
AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 10
(2015),
https://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-ClementWhite-Paper-1-6-15.pdf.
79 U.S. v. Regenerative Sciences, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(affirming jurisdiction of FDA to enforce FDCA against medical practice that
treated patients with a mixture of mesenchymal stem cells extracted from the
patients with an antibiotic that had been shipped in interstate commerce).
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considered in this paper are likely to fit within the broad statutory definition of
“device”:

vie

“an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant,
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component,
part, or accessory, which is … (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease
or other conditions, or in the care, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals ….”80
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This definition, which covers a broad range of health-care products from
simple bandages and tongue depressors to complex cardiac pacemakers,81
nonetheless seems to exclude software to improve the efficiency of health system
staffing operations. On the other hand, an algorithm that predicts which
patients are at heightened risk of developing a C. diff. infection and selects some
patients for closer monitoring seems clearly to be “intended for use … in the care,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man.”
Congress further limited the definition of device in the 21st Century Cures
Act (Cures Act),82 to exclude five specified “software functions,”83 while generally
preserving FDA’s traditional authority to regulate products intended for use in
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease.84 Some of the functions
21 U.S.C. § 321(h). In 2016 Congress added an explicit exclusion for
“software functions excluded pursuant to section 360j(o).” Id. at § 321(h)(3).
81 The statute further divides this broad category into different classes with
increasing regulatory controls based on the degree of risk they pose. 21 U.S.C. §
360c. Other statutory language includes in the definition of “device” an article
which is “(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,” or “(3) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” 21 U.S.C. §
321(h). The AI technologies considered in this paper are unlikely to meet either
of these alternative prongs of the device definition.
82 Pub. L. 114-255 (2016).
83 Id. § 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o). Congress also amended the
statutory definition of “device” to cross-reference these exclusions. See supra
note 80.
84 As amended, the statute excludes from the definition of device a software
function that is intended
(A) for administrative support of a health care facility …; (B) for
maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle …; (C) to serve as
electronic patient records … so long as – (i) such records were created,
stored, transferred, or reviewed by health care professionals, or by
individuals working under supervision of such professionals …; (D) for
transferring, storing, converting formats, or displaying clinical
laboratory test or other device data and results … unless such function
is intended to interpret or analyze clinical laboratory test or other device
data, results, and findings; or (E) … for the purpose of (i) displaying,
analyzing, or printing medical information about a patient or other
medical information …; (ii) supporting or providing recommendations to
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recited in these exclusions, such as “administrative support of a health-care
facility,” would not likely have been regulated as medical devices even prior to
the Cures Act because they fall outside the intended use limitation in the
statute.85 Others, such as maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle, involve
functions of low enough risk that FDA had previously indicated it would decline
to regulate them as a matter of enforcement discretion.86 Although these
functions are now presumptively excluded from the statutory definition of
device, Congress gave FDA authority to regulate them as devices if it makes a
finding “that such software function would be reasonably likely to have serious
adverse health consequences.”87
Two exclusions, described in subsections (D) and (E) of the Cures Act
software provisions, potentially curtail regulation of traditional software that
might otherwise have been covered by the broad statutory definition of device,
but they generally leave intact regulatory authority over more complex medical
AI. Subsection (D) excludes software functions that transfer, store, convert
formats, or display data, “unless such function is intended to interpret or
analyze” the data, in which case it remains subject to regulation as a medical
device.88 Under FDA’s interpretation, this provision allows FDA to regulate
software that allocates health system resources to those patients with the most
urgent needs:

pe

For example, if a software function is intended to prioritize patients
in an Intensive Care Unit based on their clinical status, then this
function is intended to interpret or analyze device data, results and
findings and is, therefore, not excluded from the definition of device….89
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a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a
disease or condition; and (iii) enabling such health care professional to
independently review the basis for such recommendations that such
software presents …
Pub. L. 114-255 § 3060(a) (2016), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o).
85 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Changes to Existing Medical Software
Policies Resulting from Section 3060 of the 21st Century Cures Act: Guidance for
Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff at 6–7 (2019) (hereinafter Cures Act
Changes Guidance) (previous guidance indicating that FDA intended to exercise
enforcement discretion to refrain from regulating certain medical mobile
applications designed to promote general fitness and wellness for individuals
would be modified to indicate that these applications no longer meet the
definition of “device”); id at 8–11 (previous guidance indicating that FDA
intended to exercise enforcement discretion for software functions that enable
individuals to interact with their own electronic health records would be
modified to indicate that these functions no longer meet the definition of
“device”).
87 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A). Notification of the finding and proposed order
must be published in the Federal Register with an opportunity for public
comment for at least 30 days before it becomes final. Id. at § 360j(o)(3)(B).
88 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(D).
89 Cures Act Changes Guidance, supra note 86, at 13.
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Many forms of AI technology described in this article would seem to remain
regulable under this interpretation.
Subsection (E) provides a potentially broader exclusion for clinical decision
support (CDS) software for the use of health-care professionals, but it appears
not to apply to opaque recommendations derived from complex AI algorithms.90
This exclusion covers some software functions that analyze data and that
provide recommendations to a health care professional about prevention,
diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition,91 but only if it is intended to be
sufficiently transparent to enable a health care professional “to independently
review the basis for such recommendations … so that it is not the intent that
such health care professional rely primarily on any of such recommendations to
make a clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual
patient.”92 As FDA explains in recent draft guidance, this criterion requires
disclosure of underlying data and the logic or rationale used by an algorithm in
making a recommendation to qualify for exclusion:
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In order to describe the basis for a recommendation, regardless of the
complexity of the software and whether or not it is proprietary, the software
developer should describe the underlying data used to develop the algorithm
and should include plain language descriptions of the logic or rationale used
by an algorithm to render a recommendation. … A practitioner would be
unable to independently evaluate the basis of a recommendation, and
therefore would be primarily relying upon it, if the recommendation were
based on information whose meaning could not be expected to be
independently understood by the intended HCP user (e.g., the inputs used
to generate the recommendation are not identified).93
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At least some health-care systems are working to align their AI products
with this criterion to avoid regulation. In the case of Sepsis Watch, discussed
supra in Part II, “Clinicians were instructed to put the model output into context
with other relevant information to confirm or dismiss a sepsis diagnosis. The
machine learning model did not drive clinical care in a standalone manner.”94
21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E). FDA draft guidance explains:
“Products that acquire an image or physiological signal from the
body, or from a sample from the body, or that process or analyze such
information, or both, have been regulated for many years as devices
when such acquisition, processing, or analyzing is intended for a purpose
identified in the statutory device definition.”
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Clinical Decision Support Software: Draft
Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff, at 9 (2019) (hereinafter
“CDS Draft Guidance”).
91 21 U.S.C. §§ 360j(o)(1)(E)(i), (ii).
92 Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii).
93 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Clinical Decision Support Software: Draft
Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff, at 12 (2019)
(hereinafter “CDS Draft Guidance”).
94 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 6.
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2. Enforcement discretion and its limits

vie

The developers behind the tool reported that they “worked closely with
regulatory officials to ensure that Sepsis Watch qualified as CDS and was not a
diagnostic medical device.”95
Commentators have criticized this statutory criterion and FDA’s
interpretations.96 The criterion may be difficult or impossible to satisfy for
sophisticated AI software that continuously learns from new data and makes
recommendations based on ever-changing algorithms that are opaque to users.
Even when transparency is technically possible, it may require disclosure of
valuable proprietary data and algorithms, thus forcing innovators to choose
between avoiding regulation and preserving trade secrecy.
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In addition to statutory limits on what FDA can regulate, FDA sometimes
exercises discretion to relieve innovators from the burdens of regulation for
relatively small-scale activities. For example, when Congress gave FDA
authority to regulate in vitro diagnostic devices as medical devices in the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976,97 FDA exercised discretion to refrain from
enforcement for laboratory developed tests (LDTs) that are designed,
manufactured and used within a single laboratory.98 Initially these laboratories
were small and local, but as the industry and technology evolved, the entities
taking advantage of enforcement discretion became larger and provided testing
services on a national and even international scale.99 Eventually FDA issued
draft guidance proposing to exercise greater oversight of some LDTs under a
risk-based approach that would increase oversight as necessary to protect
patient safety.100 Feedback from industry led FDA to decide against issuing final
guidance for the regulation of LDTs in the final days of the Obama
Administration101 (though the laboratories themselves remain subject to
regulation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under a
different statue102). But the absence of binding guidance does not compel FDA to
Id.
See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Pilar Ossorio, The Challenge of Regulating
Clinical Decision Support Software After 21st Century Cures, 44 AM. J.L. MED.
244–50 (2018); Efthimios Parasidis, Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a
Sensible Legal Framework, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL. 183, 191–208 (2019).
97 Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
98 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug
Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories, Framework for Regulatory
Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), at 5–7 (Oct. 2014).
99 Id. at 7–8.
100 Id.
101 U.S.Food & Drug Admin., Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed
Tests (LDTs) (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/102367/download/
(hereinafter “Discussion LDTs”).
102 CMS administers the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA), and clinical laboratories must obtain certificates of compliance or
95

Pr

ep

rin

96

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/182
24
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

Price et al.:

25

we
d

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

vie

continue a policy of enforcement discretion. Meanwhile, some laboratories have
sought premarket approval or clearance for LDTs, perhaps to signal quality or
to secure insurance coverage for their tests.103
FDA recognized the complex effects of enforcement discretion on innovation
in summing up the competing views expressed in reactions to its Draft Guidance
on LDTs:

re

While excessive oversight can discourage innovation, inadequate and
inconsistent oversight in which different test developers are treated
differently can also discourage innovation by making it difficult for highquality test developers to compete with poorer counterparts…. When
patients and providers discover that results they relied upon to make
treatment and/or diagnostic decisions were inaccurate, their confidence in
laboratory testing may be compromised… Appropriately tailored oversight
can facilitate the development of analytically and clinically valid tests and
the generation of the evidence health care providers and patients need to
make well-informed decisions.104
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Similar competing considerations inform FDA’s contemplation of how to
regulate AI functions. A challenge for regulating AI and machine learning
systems under FDA’s current authorities is that unless the technology is “locked”
prior to marketing so that the algorithm will always provide the same result in
response to the same input—an approach with its own risks105—the algorithm
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accreditation under CLIA in order to receive Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement for the testing services they provide. Ctr. for Medicare &
Medicaid
Servs.,
CLIA,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/CLIA. CLIA primarily regulates laboratories and their
procedures, requiring labs to “meet requirements relating to the proper
collection, transportation, and storage of specimens,” 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1)(B),
and to “use only personnel meeting such qualifications as the Secretary may
establish,” id. at § 263a(f)(1)(C), among other things. But CLIA regulations do
impose some requirements on the analytical validity of tests themselves, by
requiring laboratories to engage in proficiency testing and to set specifications
for their tests’ accuracy, precision, and reportable ranges. 42 C.F.R. §
493.1253(b). See also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1891–94
(2016).
103 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Opting Into Device Regulation in the Face of
Uncertain Patentability, 23 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. REV. (2019).
Laboratories performing diagnostic testing for COVID-19 may want their LDTs
to receive FDA authorization, which allows those firms to receive legal immunity
under emergency preparedness laws. Steve Usdin, FDA to Stop Reviewing
COVID-19 Lab Tests, Raising Concerns in Congress, BIOCENTURY (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.biocentury.com/article/630971/fda-to-stop-reviewing-covid-19-labtests-raising-concerns-in-congress.
104 See Discussion LDTs, supra note 101, at 1-2.
105 While locked algorithms provide the same outputs given the same input,
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will continue to change as it continues to learn from new data generated in the
course of further experience.106 This feature makes premarket regulation
problematic as a mechanism for quality oversight. At what point in the lifecycle
of a continuously changing algorithm is it time for further regulatory review?
FDA has proposed for discussion a “total product lifecycle” regulatory
approach to regulation—which may require additional statutory authority—
that relies heavily on manufacturer vigilance and best practices to provide
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness of products that change over
time.107 FDA has worked with regulators in other countries under the auspices
of the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to develop this
approach and to harmonize expectations for the regulatory treatment of these
technologies in order to promote patient safety while fostering innovation.108 As
envisioned, regulators or third party evaluators would assess the culture of
quality and organizational excellence of a particular company in a
precertification program to ensure that manufacturers will monitor their devices
to continually manage patient risks throughout the product lifecycle.109 FDA
would conduct premarket review for those devices that require it, establish clear
expectations for manufacturers to continually manage patient risks throughout
the product lifecycle, and require ongoing postmarket performance reporting
and transparency.110 Product changes that change the intended use would
require a new premarket submission.111 Although the plan has not yet been
finalized, FDA reaffirmed its approach in January 2021.112
By reducing the regulatory burden on incremental product changes, this
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inputs change as the real world does, which can degrade algorithm performance
over time. Sharon E. Davis et al., Calibration Drift in Regression and Machine
Learning Models for Acute Kidney Injury, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N
1052, 1053 (2017).
106 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Proposed Regulatory Framework for
Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Based
Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Discussion Paper and Request for
Feedback (2019) (hereinafter “Proposed Framework for Modifications”).
107 Id. at 7-14.
108 See Int’l Med. Device Regulator’s Forum, Software as a Medical Device
(SaMD):
Key
Definitions
(2013),
http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-keydefinitions-140901.pdf; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Software as a Medical Device
(SAMD): Clinical Evaluation, Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin.
Staff (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/software-medical-device-samd-clinical-evaluation.
109 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Developing a Software Precertification
Program:
A
Working
Model;
v.1
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download; see also Rachel E. Sachs,
Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37 Yale J. Reg. 219, 248 (2020).
110 Proposed Framework for Modifications, supra note 106, at 12-15.
111 Id. at 11-12.
112 FDA, FDA Releases Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Action Plan,
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-releases-artificialintelligencemachine-learning-action-plan (Jan. 12, 2021).
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approach would permit software firms to perform their own quality oversight as
they continually update their products. But the focus on company culture may
offer less relief to new AI user innovators such as health systems and insurers
that do not have a history of exercising quality oversight over software products.
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3. Implications for Medical AI
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The regulatory implications for the technologies considered in this article
are mixed. Some software functions—including “back office” administrative
tasks such as billing and insurance reimbursement, general wellness and
healthy lifestyle support, and electronic health records—may be categorically
excluded from regulation as devices, although the boundaries of the excluded
categories may be blurry enough to encourage prior consultation with FDA to be
sure. Even for categorically excluded software functions, the Cures Act gives
FDA authority to override the exclusion by finding that it is “reasonably likely
to have serious adverse health consequences.”113
AI technologies that pertain more directly to diagnosis and treatment of
patients will likely continue to meet the statutory definition of devices, although
FDA might choose to regulate them with a light touch. The FDCA gives FDA
considerable flexibility to classify medical devices into three different risk
categories with different levels of regulatory controls.114 FDA may also exercise
enforcement discretion rather than exercising its full authority to regulate some
devices that it believes pose low risk to the public.115 For example, FDA recently
stated in draft guidance that it does not intend to enforce compliance with the
applicable device requirements of the FDCA for CDS functions intended to
inform clinical management for non-serious situations or conditions, even when
health care providers are unable to independently review the basis for the
recommendation.116 Discretionary forbearance from regulation under
21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3).
21 U.S.C. § 360c. Class I devices pose the lowest risk and are subject to
the lowest level of regulatory controls, with increasing levels of regulatory
controls for the higher risk devices in Class II and Class III. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin.,
Overview
of
Device
Regulation
(Aug.
31
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatoryassistance/overview-device-regulation.
115 E.g., CDS Draft Guidance, supra note 90, at 16 (indicating when FDA
intends to exercise enforcement discretion for low-risk software functions
intended to provide clinical decision support). See also U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Policy for Device Software Functions and Mobile Medical Applications, Guidance
for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff 2 (Sept. 27, 2019) (“[T]he FDA
intends to apply its regulatory oversight to only those software functions that
are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patient’s
safety if the device were to not function as intended.”).
116 Id. at 16-17, 20-21. Examples in the draft guidance of functions that are
intended to inform clinical management for non-serious situations or conditions
include a machine-learning algorithm for which the logic and inputs are not
113
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circumstances specified in nonbinding guidance documents may impress upon
innovators a lurking possibility of regulation, allowing FDA to monitor new
technologies informally without expending the administrative resources
necessary for premarket approval or clearance of every product.
These provisions leave considerable uncertainty as to whether and how far
FDA will assert regulatory authority, making it advisable for innovators to
consult with FDA to avoid surprises. Some innovators, such as the Duke Sepsis
Watch System developers, are doing so.117 When innovators work closely with
regulatory officials as they design their products, FDA has an opportunity to
oversee and guide product development, and perhaps to decide that the product
requires a more robust process of premarket clearance or approval. Other
innovators, however, have described little to no interaction with FDA officials.118
These include health systems with actively running AI systems that make
predictions and recommendations about patient care.119
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In sum, the weight of FDA regulation of medical AI, as felt by innovators,
appears to be fairly light—at least relative to many other biomedical devices.
The landscape is complex, and developers of medical AI technologies intended
for patient care face considerable uncertainty about whether and to what extent
FDA will regulate these technologies as medical devices. Although some AI
functions, such as staff optimization, are excluded from regulation as devices,
FDA retains authority to regulate AI functions that are intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a disease or condition in
patients. The FDCA allows leeway for FDA to determine the appropriate level
of regulatory controls for different devices depending on its assessment of the
risks they present. FDA may nonetheless refrain from regulating some of these
technologies, at least for now. In the face of uncertainty, some innovators may
consult with FDA as they develop new technologies, allowing it to maintain
oversight and to guide product development in ways that give it considerable
control over patient risks.

B. Patent law

rin

Patents are typically considered an important incentive for biomedical
innovation. In theory, patent law provides a unitary system of legal rights for
inventions in all fields of technology.120 In practice, some industries rely on
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explained that alerts health care providers to triggers that may indicate
cholesterol management issues.
117 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 6.
118 Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020); Email from anonymous member of a major
academic medical center’s machine-learning implementation committee (Aug.
24, 2020).
119 Id.
120 Indeed, members of the World Trade Organization may now be required
to apply the same rules of patent law to all fields under Article 27(1) of the

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/182
28
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

Price et al.:

29

we
d

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

vie

patents more heavily than others,121 and courts and legislatures have adapted
in a variety of ways.122 The pharmaceutical industry consistently reports that
patent incentives are essential to its willingness to invest in new drug
development, while the story is more mixed in other fields.123 Although many
firms are pursuing patents on medical applications of AI and ML throughout the
world,124 the patent eligibility of these inventions under U.S. law is nonetheless
in some doubt in light of case law over the past decade.125 Some scholars have
argued more broadly that aspects of patent doctrine (such as requirements for
inventorship, nonobviousness, disclosure and claims) make it a poor fit for AI,126
while others argue that the patent system can adapt as it has done in the past
to allow for patents on other new technologies.127 The U.S. Patent & Trademark
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C
to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (1995) (TRIPS
Agreement).
121 Luigi Orsenigo & Valerio Sterzio, Comparative Study of the Use of Patents
in Different Industries, Working Paper no. 33/2010, Knowledge,
Internationalization & Technology Studies, Universita Bocconi (2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luigi_Orsenigo/publication/254400700_Co
mparative_Study_of_the_Use_of_Patents_in_Different_Industries/links/00b495
3a2d1294b2e4000000.pdf.
122 See Mark A. Lemley and Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003)
123 See, e.g., Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The Importance of Patents to
Innovation: Updated Cross-Industry Comparisons with Biopharmaceuticals, 25
EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 739 (2015); Bronwyn H. Hall &
Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents, 39 RESEARCH POLICY
994 (2009); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1286 (2009).
124 See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Technology Trends
2019: Artificial Intelligence (2019) (noting that AI-related patenting is growing
rapidly, with machine learning patent filings increasing at an average annual
rate of 28% since 2013 and using patent data analytics to identify research
trends in AI); Appleyard Lees, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in
Healthcare: An Intellectual Property Perspective (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.appleyardlees.com/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-inhealthcare/ (noting a “surge in filings of patent applications by companies that
have not traditionally been associated with the healthcare sector” such as
Google, Microsoft, and Apple).
125 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
126 E.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoquiong Liu, When Artificial
Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at
the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2018).
127 Dan L. Burk, AI Patents and the Self-Assembling Machine, 105
Minnnesota
Law
Review
Headnotes
(forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628791.
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Office (PTO) recently published a report summarizing a range of views
expressed in public comments on patent-related issues regarding artificial
intelligence and affirming its priority “to promote the understanding and
reliability of intellectual property (IP) rights in relation to AI technology.”128 In
an environment of uncertainty, patents appear to provide weaker incentives for
medical AI innovation.

1. Patent eligibility

er

re

Four decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 revived
and extended long dormant judicial limitations on patentable subject matter for
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”129 Two decisions in
particular have created uncertainty as to the patent eligibility of inventions in
two fields that converge in medical AI: medical diagnostics and computer
software.130
In Mayo v. Prometheus131 the Court relied on the “laws of nature” exclusion
to invalidate a patent on a method of optimizing treatment with a drug by
measuring drug metabolite levels in a patient’s serum and comparing them to
specified reference values to determine whether it is necessary to raise or lower
the dosage level for the patient.132 The unanimous Court held that the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Public Views on Artificial Intelligence
and
Intellectual
Property
at
1
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_AI-Report_202010-07.pdf.
129 See supra note 125 and sources cited therein. The revived limitations
claim authority from a number of older decisions including Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Cf. Jeffrey S. Lefstin, The Three Faces
of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C.J.L. & TECH
647, 651–56 (2015) (characterizing recent decisions as the Court “turn[ing] its
back on the traditional framework for patent eligibility” that “drew the boundary
of patent-eligibility at practical application” in favor of a new requirement of
“inventive application.”).
130 See Jeffrey S. Lefstin, Peter S. Mennell & David O. Taylor, Final Report
of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing
Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 581–591 (2018)
(summarizing views expressed at a workshop including industry
representatives, legal practitioners, legal scholars, and policymakers); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 BOSTON U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256
(2015).
131 566 U.S. 66 (2013).
132 More specifically, the patent claimed:
“A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immunemediated
gastrointestinal
disorder,
comprising:
“(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
“(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-

Pr

ep

rin

tn
ot

pe

128

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/182
30
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

Price et al.:

31

we
d

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

re

vie

relationship between metabolite levels and need to adjust drug dosage was a law
of nature, and that the patent’s other claim elements (administering the drug
and measuring metabolite levels in a patient) did not add enough to the recited
natural correlations to qualify as patent-eligible processes.133
Two years later, in Alice v. CLS Bank134 the Court relied on the exclusion for
“abstract ideas” to invalidate a patent on a computer-implemented method for
mitigating settlement risk in a transaction.135 The Court set forth a two-step
patent eligibility test (the Alice/Mayo test): (1) is the claim directed to one of the
judicial exclusions; and (2) if so, is there “an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element
or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept
itself?”136
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mediated
gastrointesti
nal
disorder,
8
“wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 red blood cells
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject
and
8
“wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10 red blood
cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently ad ministered
to said subject.” Id. at 74–75; U.S. Pat. No. 6,355,623 (issued March 12, 2002).
133 566 U.S. at 72.
134 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
135 More specifically, the patent claimed:
“A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a
credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and
debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the
steps of:
“(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the
exchange institutions;
“(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each
shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
“(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory
institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit
record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow
debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each
said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and
“(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange
institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the
respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted
transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed
on the exchange institutions.” Id. at 213 fn. 2; U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (issued Oct.
19, 1999).
136 Id. at 217-18 (cleaned up). Critics say this test improperly conflates
patent eligibility with satisfaction of patent law standards and creates
considerable uncertainty as to the types of inventions that are patent eligible,
particularly in the life sciences and information technology. Kevin Emerson
Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea,”15 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says
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Lower courts applying this test have invalidated hundreds of previously
issued patents in recent years,137 often ruling on patent eligibility as a matter of
law at the outset of litigation without developing an evidentiary record.138 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) have largely fallen in line behind the approach of the
Supreme Court, although sometimes with explicit disagreement and lament.139
The result has been considerable uncertainty as to what remains patent eligible
in the fields of software, business methods, and medical diagnostics,140 as many
patents are struck down and as the Federal Circuit and PTO consider arguments
to narrow the exclusions.141 In this environment it is difficult to assess with

Pr

ep

rin

tn
ot

pe

er

re

Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765 (2014); Eisenberg; supra note 130.
137 Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years
of Case Law Since Alice v. CLS Bank: Part I, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08/29/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrantanalyzing-five-years-of-case-law-since-alice-v-cls-bank-part-i/id=112722/.
138 For a thoughtful and comprehensive of recent cases see Paul R.
Gugliuzza, THE PROCEDURE OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 586–
591 (2018) (finding that courts often invalidate patent for lack of patentable
subject matter at the pleading stage without developing an evidentiary record).
139 Disagreement and lament appear in multiple opinions from members of
the Federal Circuit concurring or dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc
in Athena Diagnostics v. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19979 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2019) (denying rehearing en banc in Athena
Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). See,
e.g., id. at 4-5 (opinion of Lourie, J., joined by Reyna & Chen J.J., concurring in
the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“If I could write on a clean slate,
I would write as an exception to patent eligibility, as respects natural laws, only
claims directed to the natural law itself …. I would not exclude uses or detection
of natural laws…. But we do not write here on a clean slate; we are bound by
Supreme Court precedent.”); id. at 8-9 (opinion of Hughes, J., joined by Prost,
C.J. & Taranto, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)
(“I agree that the language in Mayo, as later reinforced in Alice, forecloses this
court from adopting an approach or reaching a result different from the panel
majority’s. I also agree, however, that the bottom line for diagnostics patents is
problematic. But this is not a problem that we can solve. As an inferior appellate
court, we are bound by the Supreme Court.”).
140 Lefstin et al., supra note 130; Shahrokh Falati, Patent Eligibility of
Disease Diagnosis, 21 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 63 (2020); David O. Taylor, Amending
Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2149 (2017); Robert Sachs, Alice:
Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years of Case Law Since Alice v.
(Sept.
3,
2019),
CLS
Bank:
Part
II,
IP
WATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/09/03/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrantanalyzing-five-years-of-case-law-since-alice-v-cls-bank-part-ii/id=112769/.
141 The Federal Circuit and the PTO continue to consider arguments to apply
the Alice/Mayo two-part test narrowly. See, e.g., Rapid Litigation Management
v. CellzDirect, 827 F.3d 1042, 1047-49 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claimed method for
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confidence the patent eligibility of medical AI inventions—but it is
straightforward to conclude that patents on medical AI face real challenges in
meeting this requirement.

2. Patent disclosure requirements
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Beyond the threshold issue of patent eligibility, medical AI innovators may
have difficulty satisfying patent law requirements for an enabling disclosure of
how to make and use the invention, a written description of the invention, and
claims that particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.142 As one
of us has previously explained,143 it should be possible to provide a written
description that discloses a formally transparent AI algorithm, however
complex, in sufficient detail to permit a person of ordinary skill to make and use
the invention.144 Even for a formally opaque algorithm that is the product of an
opaque machine-learning algorithm, it may be possible to enable others to make
and use the invention by depositing the data used and the machine-learning
algorithm in a publicly available repository.145 But because the scope of
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producing a preparation of hepatocyte cells for later use that involved multiple
freeze-thaw cycles was not “directed to” the patent-ineligible discovery that such
cells were able to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles); Enfish v. Microsoft, 822
F.3d 1327, 1335-39 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claimed method was directed to an
improvement in computer-related technology rather than to abstract idea of
organizing data into a table); Vanda Pharms. v. West-Ward Pharms., 887 F.3d
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claims reciting method of treatment based on results of
diagnostic test are not excluded from patent eligibility notwithstanding that
treatment steps are conventional), cert. petition filed, call for views of solicitor
general sub nom. Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms. (Mar. 18, 2019); Natural
Alternatives v. Creative Compounds, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (method of
treatment claims patent eligibility even though method uses natural products
and treatment steps involve conventional, well-known activity). The Supreme
Court has resisted pleas to revisit patent subject matter eligibility, Hikma
Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020); HP v. Berkheimer, 140 S. Ct.
911 (2020), though the Solicitor General has noted that recent cases “have
fostered substantial uncertainty” and that “[t]he confusion created by this
Court’s recent Section 101 precedents warrants review in an appropriate case.”
Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 8 (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18817/124768/20191206151701002_18-817%20-%20Hikma%20-%20CVSG%20%20v28.pdf.
142 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), (b).
143 W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1427–32 (2015).
144 Id. at 1429.
145 Id. (observing that biotechnology inventors have relied on similar
deposits of unique biological materials to enable their inventions in patent
applications). See also Burk, supra note 127, at 2 (noting that “in many cases the

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
33
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

34

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

we
d

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 182 [2021]

re

vie

enablement limits the scope of allowable patent rights, the resulting patent
might be quite narrow if the opacity of the algorithm makes it impossible to
generalize beyond the very specific example that has been disclosed.146 Formally
opaque algorithms present similar challenges for satisfying the requirements of
written description and claim definiteness: even when it is possible to state in
words what the algorithm is, it may be challenging to claim it in broad enough
terms for the patent to have commercial value.147
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of patent law, even when
possible, has another notable downside for medical AI innovators: disclosure of
data and algorithms may destroy more effective protection for these innovations
as trade secrets.148 Access to data and control of large datasets has considerable
competitive value for AI innovators, an advantage they might well hesitate to
surrender in exchange for patent rights of uncertain validity and scope.

pe

er

Taken together, these doctrinal challenges reduce the power of the patent
system as an incentive for innovation in medical AI—at least, relative to that
system’s power in other areas of biomedical innovation such as drugs and
conventional medical devices.149 Patents are more difficult to obtain, of more
doubtful validity when granted, and more likely to cover relatively narrow
inventions. We do not claim that patents are unavailable or that the incentives
are negligible; indeed, commercial firms have filed many applications for patents
on inventions involving medical AI. Our point is simply that patent protection is
more uncertain for this technology—a risk that may discourage commercial
product developers more than it discourages the user innovators that are our
focus here.

C. Insurance reimbursement

tn
ot

A third innovation policy lever that plays a different and diminished role in
the AI space is insurance reimbursement. In most of the examples described in
Part II, AI innovators will have difficulty obtaining reimbursement directly for
the use of their AI technology from insurers, whether public (such as Medicare
and Medicaid) or private.150 To be clear, as noted in Part II, some AI tools may
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solutions developed for the patenting of biotechnological inventions appear to
provide ready answers to the concerns raised regarding patents and AI
technologies”).
146 Price, supra note 143, at 1429.
147 Id. at 1430–32.
148 Id. at 1432-36.
149 As noted above, the biomedical industry is not the only relevant baseline;
incentives provided by patents for medical AI may more closely resemble those
for software more generally, where patents have long been of questionable value.
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001); Graham et al., supra note 123, at 1262.
150 For some explicitly diagnostic AI technologies, insurance reimbursement
may be available. However, those technologies are not the focus of this Article.
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make health care delivery more efficient and enable providers to earn more
revenue on that basis, such as by allowing them to treat more patients. But the
lack of direct reimbursement distinguishes these AI innovations from traditional
health care technologies like pharmaceuticals or medical devices.
Manufacturers of typical new products can expect that their products will be
reimbursed by insurers—and the prospect of reimbursement factors into
innovation decisions.151 Insurance will not provide reimbursement for the cost of
using the innovations we consider, nor will reimbursement decisions provide
quality oversight in this context.
Insurance reimbursement has not traditionally been recognized as part of
the innovation policy toolkit, but in recent years scholars have increased their
focus on insurance as a key driver of innovation incentives for health care
technologies.152 Insurance reimbursement functions very much like an
innovation prize.153 It is an ex post reward provided for the development of an
innovative medical technology, funded largely by public subsidies, and reserves
a relatively large role for the government or private insurers in setting the size
of the award.154 Insurers’ decisions to provide reimbursement for a new drug or
device create a market for that product, and innovators respond by investing in
the development of products that they expect will find a ready market (in the
form of insurance reimbursement) once they make them available.155
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They are much more likely to fit into the classic medical device paradigm and
likely also are subject to FDA review.
151 In the case of prescription drugs, insurers are often compelled by law to
provide such reimbursement. Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102
MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2316–17 (2018).
152 See, e.g., Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8, at 178; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the
Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 5 (2017); Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 75, 105–07 (2020); Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The
Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
613, 645–55 (2010); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as a
Case Study, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128–29 (2007); Benjamin N. Roin,
Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
999, 1012–13 (2014).
153 Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8; See also generally, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Nancy
Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
2002); see also Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 528 (2001) (cataloging the
literature).
154 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 307–08, 348 (2013)
155 These pressures are less acute for non-health goods, which typically
require fewer resources to develop in the first instance (as the FDA review
process is both costly and time consuming) and which are typically inexpensive
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The creation of Medicare Part D is an example of these dynamics. When
Medicare Part D was passed in 2003,156 it provided a prescription drug benefit
to many Medicare enrollees who had previously lacked coverage entirely, or who
had less comprehensive coverage.157 As a result, Part D expanded the potential
market for pharmaceutical companies by both increasing the number of seniors
with the ability to pay for their products and by increasing the prices that
pharmaceutical companies could expect to recoup for sales to seniors who
previously had less remunerative insurance.158 Economists studying Part D
found that after its passage, pharmaceutical investment increased in drug
classes with higher Medicare market share.159 Economists analyzing other
market-creating policy changes (such as particular coverage mandates) have
found similar results.160
But direct insurance reimbursement is unlikely for these new AI
technologies. Some functions are not directly reimbursable at all, such as AI
systems that help schedule emergency rooms or reduce patient waiting time.
Risk predictors that are routinely run for all patients, such as predictors of
sepsis or readmission risk, are similarly unlikely to be directly billed or
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enough to enable consumers to purchase them directly. Americans might be able
to save up for a new or used smartphone—a one-time purchase costing several
hundred dollars—but cannot afford more than a million dollars per year for a
lifesaving medication. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, The $6 Million
Drug
Claim,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases.html.
156 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26
and 42 U.S.C.) Part D was not created until nearly forty years after the passage
of the initial Medicare statute. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 368–70 (1982).
157 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 2010 5 (May 2010)
(“Prior to January 1, 2006, . . . about one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and
older, and one-third of poor (34%) and near-poor (33%) seniors, had no drug
coverage.”); see also Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and
Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey, HEALTH AFF. W5-152, W5-160
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/04/19/
hlthaff.w5.152.citation.
158 Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be
Negotiated Under Part D of Medicare? And If So, How?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 33, 34,
36–37 (2008).
159 See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare
Part D on Pharmaceutical R&D 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13857, 2008). But see David Dranove et al., Pharmaceutical Profits
and the Social Value of Innovation 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the findings of Blume-Kohout and Sood by
noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge).
160 See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy:
Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527, 528 (2004); Wesley Yin,
Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1060,
1061 (2008).
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reimbursable; instead, they are more likely to be folded into overall facilities
charges. Providers may nonetheless recover these costs diffusely, as they seek
reimbursement for the care they provide as a whole.
To be sure, there may be financial incentives to use new health care
technologies even without specific insurance reimbursement for them. AI
technologies that have the potential to increase clinical volume (or even the
explicit goal of doing so), such as the example from Cedars-Sinai discussed in
Part II, would likely enable providers to earn more money for the increased
services they provide, even if they would not be able to bill directly for the use of
the AI product. And some administrative AI tools can increase insurance
reimbursement for non-AI services by scouring medical records for billable
efforts or diagnoses that may not have been coded for reimbursement.161
Other forms of indirect financial incentives come from attempts to alter
payment methodologies to reimburse providers for the value, rather than the
volume, of the care they provide. Some are more formal: the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has been working to increase the amount of
its reimbursement that is based on quality or value, both in the hospital setting
and in the outpatient physician setting.162 Prior to these and other reforms,
providers may have obtained more reimbursement if a patient suffered an
avoidable complication (such as a fall or certain hospital-acquired infections), as
the providers could then bill for the treatment of that complication on top of their
earlier services.163 But if providers can no longer bill for treating complications
like these—or if they even face financial penalties for their occurrence—health
systems may have greater incentives to develop and adopt AI technologies that
would reduce adverse events, such as the Sepsis Watch program,164 or UT
Southwestern’s readmission risk predictor.165 Some changes are informal: using
AI technology to improve efficiency or quality may provide leverage to negotiate
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One hospital uses machine learning to identify un-coded reimbursable
elements in electronic health record notes, and flags them for review by manual
reviewers. Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s
machine learning program (Dec. 30, 2020).
162 See, e.g., Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS
Efforts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015);
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., HHS to Deliver Value-Based
Transformation
in
Primary
Care
(April
22,
2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/04/22/hhs-deliver-value-basedtransformation-primary-care.html.
163 See, e.g., Teresa M. Waters et al., Effect of Medicare’s Nonpayment for
Hospital Acquired Conditions: Lessons for Future Policy, 175 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 347 (2015).
164 Duke Today, Duke Health Licenses Technology Aimed to Reduce Sepsis in
Hospitals (July3, 2019), https://today.duke.edu/2019/07/duke-health-licensestechnology-aimed-reduce-sepsis-hospitals.
165 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Hospital Readmissions
Reduction
Program
(HRRP)
(last
updated
Jan.
6,
2020),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/Value-Based-Programs/HRRP/Hospital-Readmission-ReductionProgram.
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higher reimbursement rates for care. At least one health system has been able
to negotiate higher rates for office visits in part because its predictive algorithms
decrease the number of hospitalizations.166
Nevertheless, though there are certainly reimbursement-inflected
incentives for development of medical AI, especially by user-innovators, these
incentives are less direct than for traditional new biomedical products. If
policymakers want greater innovation for a certain type of vaccine, for instance,
they can commit to reimburse that vaccine at a higher rate to drive that
innovation; this type of explicit, reimbursement-driven incentive structure, and
its associated policy tools, is less prominent in the medical AI space.
Another innovation-related benefit of insurance is also difficult to apply in
this space: the role insurance plays in ensuring quality oversight of new health
products. Insurance companies often serve as independent evaluators of new
medical technologies, demanding information on the safety and efficacy of
particular products before agreeing to provide reimbursement for them. Even if
laws require insurance coverage, as they do for many payers in the case of new
drugs,167 insurers may use information about drug effects to create preferred
drug lists, favoring some drugs over others, or to create prior authorization
requirements that impose additional administrative hurdles on physicians and
patients before they can obtain a particular product.168
Insurers’ quality oversight role is particularly important when the FDA
is less likely to require data from high quality studies as a condition of market
access.169 Although FDA review of new medical devices is far less stringent than
review of new drugs, insurers often demand that additional criteria are met—
beyond FDA authorization—before they will agree to cover a particular
product.170 Insurer review may thus fill the gap in FDA’s information-forcing
function for less regulated products.171 But when FDA oversight is weak or
unlikely, and insurers are not directly reviewing AI tools for possible
reimbursement, there is reason for concern about the quality of these AI
innovations.
To be sure, in some cases it will be readily apparent that an AI tool is not
effective for its intended use. If sepsis rates do not drop, or if 30-day readmission
Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020).
167 Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307
(2018).
168 Cigna, What is Prior Authorization and How Does the Process Work?
(2018),
https://www.cigna.com/individuals-families/understandinginsurance/what-is-prior-authorization.
169 See supra Part III.A.
170 Nick Paul Taylor, CMS Rejects 1st Colorectal Cancer Blood Test, Tweaks
Path for Exact, Guardant and Others, HEALTHCAREDIVE (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cms-rejects-1st-colorectal-cancer-bloodtest-tweaks-path-for-exact-guarda/593657/.
171 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare
Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007).
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rates are unchanged, a health system may re-evaluate its approach for that AI
product. But in other cases it will be more difficult to identify whether an AI tool
is safe and effective. Perhaps the tool does work to drive down the rate of the
complication targeted by the algorithm—but maybe there are also many false
positives, and many patients receive unnecessary treatment as a result. Or, as
we have already noted, perhaps the tool benefits some racial groups and not
others.172 A lack of direct insurance reimbursement makes it much more difficult
for insurers to meet these needs for additional quality oversight.
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The previous two Parts have catalogued how user innovators face
substantially different incentives and development costs in the medical AI
context than manufacturers face for more familiar biomedical products like
traditional medical devices or drugs. Patents and insurance reimbursement
provide weaker incentives for these innovations. But the development costs and
barriers to entry are lower as well. Many of these medical AI innovations have
been developed and used without going through a potentially lengthy FDA
approval or clearance process. Nor do they require building new production
facilities; while assembling data and informatics capacity can be expensive,
institutions that have these resources may develop and implement AI products
relatively inexpensively. Lower development costs make innovation a
reasonable investment even when benefits are lower, and even when benefits
come primarily from internal efficiency improvements rather than from external
market sales.173
This legal landscape enables user innovation by health systems and insurers
and has at least three interconnected implications for innovation processes.
First, the availability and quality of data impacts both who can innovate and the
quality of their innovations. Second, the products that result are often
contextualized, focusing on custom solutions to local problems. Such products
may be less easily influenced by policy tools aimed at increasing broader social
welfare. Third and finally, these products face less oversight than do many
biomedical products, leading to the risk of quality problems that may be difficult
to detect.

A. Data control

rin

A substantial barrier to innovation in this space seems to be the availability
of high-quality data on which to train AI, which limits the types of users who
can successfully innovate. AI requires large amounts of data, and assembling,

See Obermeyer, supra note 62.
An instructive parallel is laboratory-developed diagnostic tests. True,
FDA exercises enforcement discretion against the makers of laboratorydeveloped tests at least in part because those tests were traditionally relatively
simple. But it seems also likely that institutions are willing to develop and use
their own tests when that development might not be cost-effective if coupled
with an FDA approval or clearance process.
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formatting, and curating those data from multiple and heterogeneous sources is
an expensive task.174 Accordingly, developing AI seems to be easiest for those
entities that already possess substantial stores of data—among them large
health systems (especially academic medical centers) and health insurers.175
Indeed, even those data-holders uninterested in developing their own projects
have gotten into the game. The Veterans Administration, while engaging in
minimal internal AI projects for reasons including a lack of expert programmers,
has entertained many requests for collaboration and tool-building, largely based
on the value of its substantial longitudinal dataset.176 And insurers have used
the lure of their data as a prize for developers who create useful algorithms.177
Although advantageous for health systems and insurers, the central role of data
access has problematic implications.
One potential source of concern is the size of datasets available to user
innovators. If in-house development relies on in-house data, only some entities
will have access to the very large datasets necessary for training high-quality
AI. They may be able to create solid products for their own use (though the
performance of single-system development even with very large datasets may
lag the performance that could be obtained from training similar algorithms
across multi-system data178). Entities with smaller datasets are more likely to
introduce quality problems or biases into resulting AI systems. A particularly
dangerous middle ground are those entities that have sufficient data to plausibly
create useful AI products, but insufficient data to weed out possible bias or
performance issues. Moreover, the ability of some powerful actors within the
health system to develop in-house products based solely on their own data may
reduce the impetus for broader data-sharing efforts, including the creation of
large-scale centralized datasets.179 Indeed, the value of data as a resource for AI
W. Nicholson Price II, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016).
175 W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 65, 81–83 (2020) (hereinafter Price, Contextual Bias); see also VON HIPPEL
at 8 (“When information is sticky, innovators tend to rely largely on information
they already have in stock.”).
176 Interview with anonymous Veterans Affairs official involved in
informatics (June 25, 2020).
177 See, e.g., Announcement of Requirements and Registration for “Artificial
Intelligence Health Outcomes Challenge”, U.S. Dept. Health & Human Services,
(June 7, 2019), https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/aichallenge-pubnotice.pdf;
BlueCross BlueShield Data Innovation Challenge, Blue Health Intelligence, (April
2019), https://www.bcbs.com/bluecross-blueshield-data-innovation-challenge.
178 Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Artificial intelligence could revolutionize
medical care. But don’t trust it to read your x-ray just yet, SCIENCE (Jun. 17,
2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/artificial-intelligence-couldrevolutionize-medical-care-don-t-trust-it-read-your-x-ray.
179 The All of US cohort is one such effort. See Joshua C. Denny et al., The
“All of Us” Research Program, 381 N. ENGL. J. MED. 668, 668 (2019).
Theoretically, large-scale organizations could self-organize to promote datasharing, but there are structural barriers to such efforts, including HIPAA and
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product development may further encourage the trend of data-hoarding, slowing
the development of better tools trained on larger aggregations of shared data.
To be sure, some problems may truly demand localized solutions, as the user
innovation literature points out; perhaps the factors that drive C. difficile
infection in one hospital are fundamentally different from those that drive
infection in another.180 But perhaps not. At a minimum, it would be worth
probing why such a biological result seems so context-dependent.181 For other
products, like a staffing prediction or patient-flow model, context specificity
seems likely to be typical. It is nonetheless problematic that smaller entities may
have smaller datasets for their own context, and are therefore at higher risk of
developing erroneous AI systems.
If the availability of data is a major hurdle, we should also expect to see
substantial discrepancies among health entities in their ability to develop their
own AI systems at all. Small community health systems, for instance, are much
less likely to have the data capacity (or, for that matter, the informationtechnology capacity) to develop their own algorithms. To the extent that selfdeveloped AI systems adapted to a particular system become important for
providing high-quality health care, for interacting with insurers or other
systems, or for maintaining a competitive level of efficiency, smaller systems will
be especially disadvantaged. If smaller systems react by attempting to adopt AI
products developed in larger systems, systematic quality or bias problems may
occur as a result of differences in patient populations and care patterns, as
described in Section IV.C below.182 More optimistically, perhaps larger systems
that develop successful products for their own use will license them to
commercial firms to test and refine them further for more widespread use by
smaller systems as commercial products.
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B. Contextualized products
Health systems and insurers as user innovators are likely to develop
different products for different needs than firms developing biomedical
innovations for sale to others. Most obviously, as the user innovation literature
suggests, user innovators (whether health systems, insurers, or some other type
of entity) will tend to develop products that are closely suited to their own
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other privacy protections. See W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in
Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. no. 1 (2017) (hereinafter Price,
Risk and Resilience). If large organizations can make substantial progress using
only their own data—even if this progress falls short of what consolidated
datasets might permit—they face lower incentives to try to overcome those
barriers.
180 Cf. Jenna Wiens et al. A study in transfer learning: leveraging data from
multiple hospitals to enhance hospital-specific predictions, 21 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASSN. 699, 699 (2014) (finding better performance of C. difficile
infections when a model was trained on data from multiple hospitals).
181 See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity through
Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. __ (2021).
182 See Price, Contextual Bias, supra note 175, at 90–98.
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particular needs.183
AI may be especially useful for such contextual solutions. Where data
formats, care patterns, and health problems are specific to a particular context,
as the fragmented nature of U.S. health care suggests will be common,184 AI
products developed by users may be an effective solution that would be
foreclosed if development costs and legal hurdles were higher. Thus, health
systems can develop products to model and predict patient flow that are
particularly responsive to their own patient dynamics.185 Duke’s Sepsis Watch
AI tool illustrates the importance of user-developed contextual knowledge to
technical AI success. This app, developed by a team at Duke University, uses
machine learning to determine a patient’s risk of developing sepsis; however, in
order for Sepsis Watch to work, successful implementation has required
disruption to the ordinary workflow in the emergency department; Duke ER
nurses, assigned as primary users of the app, needed to reverse the typical ER
chain of command to alert ER physicians of the app’s findings. This kind of
disruption may have doomed another AI product, but Duke’s Sepsis Watch tool
has been very successful at significantly reducing sepsis-induced patient deaths
at Duke Health. This success is at least partially due to the fact that Sepsis
Watch was created for the specific context of the Duke emergency department.
Madeleine Eilish, a member of the Duke team evaluating the implementation of
Sepsis Watch at Duke, cited the context-specific user development of Sepsis
Watch as one of the keys to the app’s success, noting that “the tool was adapted
for a hyper-local, hyper-specific context: it was developed for the emergency
department at Duke Health and nowhere else.”186
VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 8 (“One consequence of the information
asymmetry between users and manufacturers is that users tend to develop
innovations that are functionally novel, requiring a great deal of user-need
information and use-context information for their development. In contrast,
manufacturers tend to develop innovations that are improvements on wellknown needs and that require a rich understanding of solution information for
their development.”)
184 See, e.g., John Wennberg et al., An Agenda for Change: Improving Quality
and Curbing Health Care Spending, DARTMOUTH INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2008) (describing practice variations and pattern
changes); OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., CONNECTING
HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO ACHIEVE AN
INTEROPERABLE
HEALTH
IT
INFRASTRUCTURE
(2014),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC10year
InteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf (describing interoperability and data
fragmentation challenges).
185 Michael Thompson, New Ways to Improve Hospital Flow with Predictive
Analytics, Presentation at Health Analytic Systems 2019 (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://downloads.healthcatalyst.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/11Applying_Predictive_Analytics_For_Improving_Hospital_Flow-ThompsonHAS2019.pdf.
186 Karen Hao, How an AI tool for fighting hospital deaths actually worked
TECH.
REV.
(October
2,
2020),
in
the
real
world,
MIT
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One potential concern that might arise from this different landscape is
whether innovative efforts are being put toward the most socially beneficial
uses.187 Innovators engage in efforts based on the data that they have, the
incentives they face in their own contexts, and the particular problems that seem
most pressing to them. Sometimes this can reflect useful customization to
genuinely local problems, as the user innovation literature suggests.188 But
problems that are especially pressing for one academic medical center may
reflect systematic problems that are best tackled at a broader level, rather than
having individual institutions each devoting limited innovation resources to
addressing the same problems locally. Siloed local innovation may also decrease
the opportunities for learning from others—a problem that may be especially
aggravated if privacy laws make it more difficult to share data with other
institutions.189
Where context is not particularly important, user innovation may be less
important. For instance, although there is some user innovation related to
billing,190 examples are not plentiful. On the other hand, there are already
several commercial products available that use AI for billing optimization,
suggesting that context specificity may be less important for this type of product
and it can more readily be developed by outsiders for sale to a broader market.
The commercially developed 3M 360 Encompass System,191 for example, scans
medical records to identify services that were provided to a patient, suggesting
which codes can be billed to insurers.192 On the insurer side, Kirontech touts the
use of unsupervised machine learning and natural language processing to
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https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/02/1009267/ai-reduced-hospitaldeaths-in-the-real-world/
187 In a highly stylized account of how patents promote innovation, the
patent system theoretically directs innovators to make the most socially
beneficial innovations by linking rewards to the market value of patented
goods—but as we have discussed, the incentives from the patent system appear
to be less salient in this context. In addition, a substantial literature catalogs
the limits of the ability of patents to drive socially beneficial innovation. E.g.,
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8;
Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2011), W. Nicholson Price II, The
Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769 (2020).
188 VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33–44.
189 See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and
Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 JAMA 1141, 1141–42 (2019).
190 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
191 3M, Real-time clinical insights for physicians and CDI teams,
https://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/health-information-systemsus/providers/clinical-documentation/cdi-engage-one/.
192 3M Health Information Systems, Real results: A profile of eight
organizations
boosted
by
the
3M™
360
Encompass™
System,
https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/955410O/3m-360-encompass-realresults-8-profiles.pdf.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
43
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783879

44

NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI

we
d

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 182 [2021]

validate claims and to detect fraudulent health insurance claims in real time.193

C. Decreased quality oversight
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Medical AI innovations are likely to be implemented with less independent
quality oversight relative to other medical devices, including commercially
developed point-of-care AI. As described above, quality oversight for some new
health technologies comes from FDA regulation and insurance coverage
determinations, both of which provide some assessment of quality. These two
players have a smaller role in assessing many of the products we describe here,
leading to less oversight for safety and effectiveness. Thus, many algorithms
that may have an impact on patient care receive less vetting before they are
implemented and may thus cause harm because of undiscovered error.194
We need not look far to see how such error might occur.195 One team at Mt.
Sinai developed an AI algorithm to identify pneumonia based on patient chest
x-ray images.196 The algorithm was trained on Mt. Sinai data, where many chest
x-rays came from patients with pneumonia, and detected pneumonia 93% of the
time.197 When the algorithm was tested on images from the NIH and the Indiana
Network for Patient care, performance dropped sharply. One reason was that
the rates of pneumonia at those sites were lower, and the patient populations
were different. Another reason was that the algorithm had learned to predict
outcomes based on whether the image came from a portable x-ray machine or a
fixed machine—and the latter are typically used on sick patients.198 Had this
algorithm been developed and deployed for clinical care, such a performance
pattern would be highly problematic. The algorithm might appear to function
decently at Mt. Sinai, since it would be relying on the same provider-created
information (e.g., the use of portable x-rays) that it was trained on—but it
wouldn’t provide as much useful information as the hospital thought, and its
performance would degrade over time as care patterns shifted. If, for instance,

Kirontech, Medical Payment Integrity, https://www.kirontech.com/
To be sure, algorithms that have the highest impact on patient care are
those FDA is most likely to regulate, and even if software does not normally fall
within the definition of a medical device under the Cures Act, FDA can
determine that the software needs to be regulated anyway. 21 U.S.C. §
360j(o)(3)(A).
195 Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Artificial intelligence could revolutionize
medical care. But don’t trust it to read your x-ray just yet, SCIENCE (Jun. 17,
2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/artificial-intelligence-couldrevolutionize-medical-care-don-t-trust-it-read-your-x-ray.
196 John R. Zech, Marcus A. Badgeley, Manway Liu, Anthony B. Costa,
Joseph J. Titano, & Eric K. Oermann, Variable generalization performance of a
deep learning model to detect pneumonia in chest radiographs: A cross-sectional
MED.
1002683
(2018),
study,
PLOS
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002683
.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 13.
193
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the hospital shifted to using portable x-ray machines more broadly, the
algorithm would suggest that many more people had pneumonia, relying on an
unreliable proxy signal. An even worse situation would arise if the algorithm
were deployed at other sites, such as the Indiana network, without testing;
performance would be substantially worse, but provider-users could easily be
none the wiser. To be sure, the type of testing described here is exactly the type
of quality oversight we might hope for, where developers evaluate performance
in different contexts. And such patterns might help demonstrate a culture of
excellence of the sort that FDA is emphasizing in its recent thinking about
regulating medical AI. Unfortunately, the vast majority of AI image analysis
algorithms are tested at only one hospital, suggesting that such problematic
development patterns are all too likely to go unnoticed.199
The failure of some AI systems will be obvious—readmissions might increase
rather than decrease—but others may go undetected. Health outcomes are
notoriously difficult to attribute to a particular intervention, which is why health
technology is described as a credence good and why formal regulatory oversight
is justified.200 For other problematic outcomes, the results may be observable but
not actually observed; if hospital algorithms result in patients suffering ills that
they self-treat with over-the-counter medications (being discharged too early, for
instance), those problems might never come to the attention of the innovator.201
Most perniciously, biased results—prioritizing wealthy or white patients, for
instance—might well accord with a hospital’s bottom-line incentives of efficiency
and revenue maximization, even if they are socially and morally repugnant and
might otherwise be detected and blocked by a regulator. This sort of problem,
too, has already occurred on a substantial scale.
As Ziad Obermeyer and colleagues documented, Optum, a unit of the large
insurer UnitedHealth Group, developed an AI system in-house to predict which
patients were likely to have medical complications, with the aim of providing
outpatient guidance services to particularly high-risk patients.202 This system

Dong Wook Kim, Hye Young Jang, Kyung Won Kim, Youngbin Shin, &
Seong Ho Park, Design characteristics of studies reporting the performance of
artificial intelligence algorithms for diagnostic analysis of medical images:
results from recently published papers, 20 KOREAN J. RADIOLOGY 405, 405 (2019)
(finding that only 6% of 516 published studies for medical AI image analysis
included external validation).
200 Price, Regulating Black Box Medicine, supra note 2.
201 The health system as a whole is generally poor at monitoring holistic
patient outcomes and learning from them. The idea of a learning health system
aims to fix this problem. See CLAUDIA GROSSMAN, BRIAN POWERS, & J. MICHAEL
MCGINNIS, EDS., DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM
2–3 (2011); Harlan Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH
AFF. 1163, 1164–69 (2014).
202
Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli, & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Dissecting racial bias in an algorithm used to manage the health
of populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Heidi Ledford, Millions of black
people affected by racial bias in health-care algorithms, 574 NATURE 608, 608
(2019), (identifying the developer as Optum).
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was developed, validated, and deployed in due course, and influenced the care
received by many patients. But, as Obermeyer’s team found, the algorithm was
not at all neutral. The developers used a reasonable proxy for complexity of
patient care: how much was spent on the patient’s care. But they didn’t account
for the fact that Black patients and other minority patients receive substantially
less care, and consequently cost less—but for reasons of systemic bias or resource
constraints, not because of medical differences. Accordingly, the algorithm
predicted white patients as being of substantially higher risk than Black
patients with the same ailments, with the result that white patients received
more outpatient coordination services. The bias went unnoticed by the
developers, presumably because the outcomes aligned reasonably with the
algorithm’s goals of reducing costly complications, as measured by later costs.
Eventually, oversight by academic researchers caught the problem, at least in
this instance, and Optum agreed to work with Obermeyer’s team to fix the
problem going forward.203 But this sort of bias could readily arise in unregulated
use of medical AI.
We do not mean to overstate the point about lessened oversight from key
players. In particular, FDA retains the authority to regulate software as a
medical device, even if the software initially falls into one of the Cures Act’s
exclusions.204 But other players might have a role here as well. Learned societies
could play some part in determining the quality of medical AI that fell within
their respective bailiwicks. The American College of Radiologists, for instance,
could evaluate medical AI that evaluates radiological images, though
homegrown products might fly under the radar of learned societies as well.
Another possibility would be to establish a system more analogous to the one
used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in their administration
of the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments program (CLIA).205
Although the FDA may be exercising its enforcement discretion as it relates to
the oversight of LDTs, those laboratories still receive a form of regulation
through CLIA, and laboratories must obtain CLIA certification if they wish to
receive reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid more generally.206 Indeed,
FDA and other regulators may ultimately design such a mechanism in the
course of ongoing efforts to adapt device regulation to software as a medical
device.207

CONCLUSION
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The development of AI tools and the widespread adoption of electronic health
records have fostered a model of innovation in medical AI that looks different
from the more familiar cases of biomedical innovation to develop new drugs and
traditional devices. Patents are less certain and less powerful; the FDA remains

Ledford, supra note 202.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
205
Ctr.
for
Medicare
&
Medicaid
Servs.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA.
206 See id.; see also footnote 102, supra.
207 See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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important but lurks in the background than rather than looming over product
entry, and insurance reimbursement provides fewer direct incentives and also
less quality oversight. And yet these products offer great prospects for improving
patient care, whether they are predicting risky outcomes, monitoring vital signs,
managing patient flow, or allocating resources. There is a world of medical AI
innovation occurring inside health systems and insurers that differs from
commercial product development in important ways. We do not suggest that we
have fully characterized this world, or that we know how to solve the problems
that may arise. Nor is the world fully separate; products that start their life as
user innovation in a single health system may well be spun out into start-up
companies or acquired by existing manufacturers, making the transition from
user innovation to a more classic commercialization model, where different legal
regimes and incentives apply. Nevertheless, the space of user innovation in
medical AI is worth further examination. We have aimed here to point out its
major features, to indicate its importance, and to raise the call for future study.
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